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Introduction
An automobile driver must carefully apportion their attention to multiple tasks, 
such as pressing the accelerator, monitoring the speedometer, adjusting the steering 
wheel to maintain proper alignment, visually scanning for a highway exit, and 
formulating a mental list of needed groceries, just to name a few. Some stimuli may 
“grab” the driver’s attention (e.g., the sudden realization that an errand was neglected), 
for better or worse. Other stimuli may be less compelling but nevertheless warrant 
consideration at times, requiring the driver to volitionally redirect their attention (e.g., 
glance at the fuel tank gage). This driving example illustrates several principles of the 
human attention system. First, the content of attention may be an object in our external 
environment or internal mental activity (e.g., Gehring, Bryck, Jonides, Albin, & Badre, 
2003). Second, our attentional resources are limited (Shapiro, 2001), which necessitates 
the frequent switching of attention during complex tasks (Burgess, 2000). Indeed, the 
Oxford English Dictionary definition of multitasking, the “ability to perform concurrent 
tasks or jobs by interleaving [italics added],” acknowledges this reality. Third, whether 
we maintain or switch the focus of our attention is influenced by bottom-up (stimulus- 
driven) and top-down (volitionally controlled) forces (Monsell, 2003). The interplay 
between these forces determines the focus of our attention at any given moment (Yantis, 
2000).
Attention switching is seamlessly coordinated, allowing us to (usually) evade 
such misfortunes as traffic accidents. This is achieved by executive control, the ability to 
volitionally direct attention in mental and physical space. To appreciate the importance 
of executive control, consider the consequences of its momentary incapacity, such as
1
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delaying to disengage from one task and switch to another, or equally problematic, 
prematurely disengaging because of a distraction. Such failures occur on occasion in 
healthy individuals, especially when they are fatigued (Manly, Lewis, Robertson, 
Watson, & Datta, 2002) or when their attention is taxed (Robertson, Manly, Andrade, 
Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997), and can be markedly exaggerated by brain disease. Certain 
brain-damaged patients tend to, on one hand, get stuck on an idea or activity, unable to 
desist. On the other hand, they may be highly distractible such that every noise, 
movement, or spontaneous thought captures their attention. Executive control is thought 
to be the most fundamental, yet perplexing problem facing cognitive neuroscientists 
(Logan, 2003; Monsell, 2003).
Despite its widespread acceptance in the research literature, the term “executive 
control” is fraught with ambiguity. It misleadingly suggests equivalence with the term 
executive functioning, which refers more generally to all capacities that support 
independent purposive behavior (Lezak, Howieson, & Loring, 2004). It also falsely 
implies that a unitary entity (i.e., homunculus) exerts the control. As shall become clear, 
control emerges from the interaction between complementary cognitive processes 
(Gruber & Goschke, 2004), not from a mysterious and unmeasurable “puppet-master.”
Executive control is closely related to the “anterior attention system” (Stuss, 
Shallice, Alexander, & Picton, 1995), “supervisory attention system” (Norman & 
Shallice, 1986), and volitional attention network (Mesulam, 1999), all of which can be 
distinguished from involuntary attentional systems. The most familiar typology of 
attention, developed and revised by Posner and colleagues (Berger & Posner, 2000; 
Posner & Dehaene, 1994; Posner & Peterson, 1990; Posner & Raichle, 1994),
2
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differentiates executive control from two other networks responsible for orienting and 
alerting/vigilance, respectively. Understanding the concept of executive control in the 
context of other higher-order cognitive functions involved in voluntary action is 
complicated by a lack of consensus in the field. Executive control is probably necessary 
but not sufficient to conceive, plan, and carry out novel goal-directed behavior. It can 
therefore be thought of as a component executive function (Lezak et al., 2004).
However, the distinction between executive control and other components, such as 
working memory and response inhibition, is unclear (Wecker, Kramer, Hallam, & Delis, 
2005). Some theorists believe them to be distinct constructs (Logan, 2004; Miyake et ah, 
2000) that work in harmony (Roberts & Pennington, 1996), whereas others remain 
unconvinced that they are theoretically separable (Kane, Bleckley, Conway, & Engle, 
2001; Kimberg & Farah, 2000).
Much work over the past decade has begun to elucidate the cognitive architecture 
of executive control. Early models that posited an omnipotent homunculus that directed 
our attention -  as exemplified by Baddeley and Hitch’s (1974) “central executive” and 
Norman and Shallice’s (1986) “supervisory attentional system” -  have become 
understood to be placeholders awaiting explanation rather than adequate accounts of 
executive control. This led to a drive towards abandoning the concept of a unitary 
attention control center or at least fractionating it into definable components (Baddeley, 
1996; Monsell & Driver, 2000; Parkin, 1998; Stuss & Alexander, 2000). Hommel, 
Daum, and Kluwe (2004) suggest parameters for this vague goal. They argue that an 
adequate model of executive control must specify what is controlled and how it is 
controlled, and ultimately, who does the controlling. Accounts for these three
3
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components based on an integrated literature review will now be discussed in turn.
“Mental sets” are what is controlled. A mental set is a response disposition or 
state of readiness for action. More formally, it is a schema that biases a cognitive 
network towards a certain action in response to a given stimulus (Mayr, 2003). These 
biases are created by constraints that come from multiple sources. One source of 
constraint is long-term memory (i.e., the network’s structure), or stimulus-response 
mappings that gradually develop over time with practice. For example, a cup (the 
stimulus) is typically grasped with the dominant hand and drawn to one’s lips (the 
response). Constraints can also be activation-based. These may be internally (e.g., 
activated goals) or externally (e.g., task instructions) generated. These activation-based 
constraints modulate the network’s structure, thereby biasing it to respond a certain way 
to a given stimulus.
Explaining how mental sets lead to behavioral responses, Goschke (2003) posits 
that response selection occurs as a process of constraint satisfaction. A mental set 
prepares the stage so that once the stimulus is presented, the chain of events leading to a 
response can then unfold automatically in a “prepared reflex” (Hommel, 2000). William 
James (1950, c l 890) elegantly summarized this view more than a century ago, stating 
that “the essential achievement of the will, in short, when it is most ‘voluntary,’ is to 
attend to a difficult object and hold it fast before the mind. The so-doing is the fiat; and it 
is a mere physiological incident that when the object is thus attended to, immediate motor 
consequences should ensue” (pg. 561).
Perhaps the most striking evidence for mental sets and their link to overt 
behavioral action comes from brain-injured patients who exhibit “utilization behavior”
4
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(Archibald, Mateer, & Kerns, 2001; Lhermitte, 1983), in which actions are elicited by 
common objects. For example, a patient may drink from a cup, not to achieve an 
intended goal (e.g., quenching thirst), but because the mere presence of those objects 
triggers their highly-associated actions.
Multiple (potentially task-relevant) mental sets may be stored in working memory 
simultaneously, with only one being activated above a certain threshold (Norman & 
Shallice, 1986). Switching mental sets, then, would require reallocation of attention to 
another mental set within working memory. This view has been criticized on the grounds 
that it would be maladaptive to hold multiple sets of rules in working memory 
simultaneously because they would cause crosstalk, or interference, especially in the case 
of overlapping stimulus-response mappings (Rubinstein, Meyer, & Evans, 2001). An 
alternative view is that only the selected mental set is activated in working memory and 
the others are eliminated (Mayr & Kliegl, 2000). In this model, switching requires 
actively retrieving a mental set from long-term memory, bringing it into working 
memory. This model is considerate of the limited capacity of working memory (Miyake 
& Shah, 1999) and is consistent with two recent findings: rapid shifting between tasks is 
independent of the number of potentially to-be-switched-to tasks (Logan, 2004) and that 
switching to complex tasks takes longer than switching to simple tasks (Yeung & 
Monsell, 2003). Thus, the literature favors the theory that only in-use mental sets are 
present in working memory (Mayr & Kliegl, 2000).
Although there is reasonable convergence in the literature regarding what is 
controlled (mental sets), debate persists over how the disengagement and engagement 
processes of a set switch play out. Rubinstein et al. (2001) propose a two-stage model
5
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that includes goal-shifting and rule-activation. Goal-shifting takes place before a 
stimulus is presented, and involves bringing goal-relevant information (e.g., that 
identifies the switched-to task) into working memory. Rule activation takes place in 
between stimulus identification and response selection, and involves engaging 
appropriate and disengaging inappropriate rules for selecting a response for the current 
task. Kleinsorge, Heuer, & Schmidtke (2002) found support for a model that 
distinguishes between set-selection operations and implementation operations. The 
former are endogenously controlled and akin to Rubinstein et al.’s (2001) “goal-shifting.” 
The latter are of two classes, an endogenously controlled one that involves encoding task 
cues and one that is exogenously controlled and similar to Rubinstein’s et al.’s “rule- 
activation.” This model is hierarchical, such that the implementation process 
automatically follows (or is for the most part a consequence of) the highest-order process, 
set-selection. Mayr and Kliegl (2003) propose a similar two-stage model that includes a 
retrieval stage, during which a cue triggers the task rules to be retrieved from long-term 
memory into working memory, and an application stage, in which the task rules are 
automatically applied at stimulus onset. What these models have in common is a 
volitional activation/retrieval stage and an automatic application/implementation stage.
Because sustained activation is characteristic of mental sets (Goschke & Kuhl,
1993), passive decay is likely insufficient to rid working memory of a no longer relevant 
mental set. Rather, deactivation of the now task-irrelevant set through inhibitory 
processes, or backward inhibition, is required (Arbuthnott & Frank, 2000; Mayr & Keele, 
2000). This may be especially true for mental sets that have been guiding behavior 
successfully for some time, and then, in an instant, are no longer appropriate. A series of
6
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experiments by Mayr and Keele (2000) revealed that subjects were slower to switch back 
to a recently abandoned task (compared to a remotely abandoned task), even when a 
return to the abandoned task set soon after was fully predictable, and this effect was only 
observed when shifts needed to be endogenously triggered. In summary, top-down 
contributions to set-switching appear to include activation of the appropriate set and 
inhibition of competing sets. This is consistent with Stuss and colleagues’ (1995; 2005) 
hypothesized component processes in set-switching.
Another aspect of the how question pertains to set selection. As alluded to earlier, 
both endogenous and exogenous forces are involved in this process (Monsell, 2003; 
Ruthruff, Remington, & Johnston, 2001). Endogenous, or top-down input may promote 
selection of the task-relevant mental set through sustained activation of the current set if 
task continuation or repetition is the goal, and inhibition of the current set/retrieval of a 
new set when shifting tasks is required. Exogenous, or bottom-up forces involve the 
automatic activation of a mental set through overleamed stimulus-response mappings. 
Since these exogenous forces operate irrespective of the subject’s goal for good task 
performance, they may or may not promote selection of the appropriate mental set. If 
they do favor selection of the task-relevant set, endogenous control would be redundant. 
If they do not, endogenous input must be sufficient to overcome exogenous forces; using 
the terminology of Norman & Shallice’s (1986) influential model, the deployment of 
supervisory attention must suppress stimulus-driven activation of schemata. The usual 
final outcome of this interaction between endogenous and exogenous forces is, assuming 
the subject is cognitively intact, the selection of the task-relevant set -  the one that 
optimizes performance (Mayr, 2003).
7
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Since endogenous input is probably applied continuously and adjusted on-line to 
minimally meet demands (Monsell, Sumner, & Water, 2003; Yeung & Monsell, 2003), 
the system must somehow “know” when exogenously-triggered responses are inadequate 
and endogenous modulation is needed. So, we are forced to assume the existence of a 
cognitive system that monitors the need for executive control functions and then 
communicates this information to brain regions that implement them. Such a component 
is necessary to account for the findings that healthy subjects modify their response biases 
on-line to optimize performance in response to committing errors (e.g., Laming, 1968) or 
changing task demands (e.g., Logan & Zbrodoff, 1979). To explain these phenomena, 
several researchers have proposed a system that monitors response conflicts, which 
trigger the need for increased executive control (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & 
Cohen, 2001; Botnivick, Braver, Yeung, Ullsperger, Carter, & Cohen, 2004; Miller & 
Cohen, 2001; Norman & Shallice, 1986). For example, when a prepotent but incorrect 
response and a correct response are both activated, as in the Stroop task, or when two (or 
more) equally correct responses are activated, as in stem completion tasks, this conflict- 
monitoring system signals the need for the recruitment of additional conscious attention 
resources.
Although this conflict-monitoring system specifies how the level of endogenous 
control is regulated in response to changing task demands, it does not explicate what type 
of control is exerted or in other words, how conflict is resolved. To fill this void, 
Goschke (2000; 2003; see also Gruber & Goschke, 2004) proposed a model that accounts 
for the quality (i.e., not just the quantity) of executive control, and thus answers Hommel 
et al.’s (2004) who question by defining executive control as emergent property
8
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complementary cognitive networks. In Goschke’s model, an ever-changing environment 
demands two central properties of the attention system: persistence and flexibility. The 
former enables intense concentration, even in the face of distracters (e.g., reading an 
article in a noisy lobby), whereas the latter refers to our ability to interrupt an ongoing 
activity to pursue a new one (e.g., dropping the magazine and leaving the building upon 
hearing the fire alarm ring) when it becomes advantageous. These properties are 
achieved by a context-sensitive balance between two control processes, one that serves 
the stable maintenance of a mental set over time and resistance of distraction, and another 
that promotes openness to potentially relevant information (i.e., background monitoring) 
and a disposition to quickly reconfigure set if the need arises. These processes are 
antagonistic, such that ramping up one incurs a cost to the other. Therefore, adaptive 
executive control requires a balance between persistence and flexibility, and pathological 
executive control is characterized by a dysregulation of this balance. A similar but less 
elaborated model put forth by Cohen, Aston-Jones, & Gilzenrat (2004) posits a system 
that receives input from the conflict-monitoring system and passes on signals to promote 
either “exploitation” (selective attention to task-relevant features) or “exploration” 
(permitting the processing of task-irrelevant features), depending on the task demands.
Conceptualization of executive control as a persistence-flexibility dilemma has 
been documented previously, such as Mesulam’s (1999) dictum that an “interplay 
between concentration and distractibility is one of the most essential prerequisites for 
advanced mental activity” (p. 238). Moreover, the paradoxical consequences of impaired 
executive control, perseveration and distractibility, have been known for some time. In 
fact, in the first detailed case report of a patient who incurred frontal lobe trauma, Harlow
9
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(1868) describes post-injury Phineas Gage as “pertinaciously obstinate, yet capricious 
and vacillating” (pg. 339). Nevertheless, Goschke appears to be the first to propose a 
plausible account for how the persistence-flexibility trade-off is dynamically regulated.
As such, his model offers great promise in advancing our understanding of executive 
control, and more generally, purposive behavior. Before this model is widely adopted, 
however, its assumptions will need to be clearly identified and empirically validated.
The task-switching paradigm has proved successful for evaluating theoretical 
models of executive control. It enables cognitive scientists to study executive control 
processes with better experimental rigor and has become the tool of choice (Miyake et al., 
2000; Monsell, 2003), espoused over those developed for clinical purposes, such as the 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (WCST; Grant & Berg, 1948; Nelson, 1976). Such clinical 
measures are highly multifactorial and likely recruit executive control to some extent, but 
undoubtedly also involve an array of other cognitive abilities (e.g., Ridderinkhof, Span,
& van der Molen, 2002). There are several variations of the task-switching paradigm, but 
all require subjects to rapidly switch back and forth between performing two simple tasks 
(e.g., classification as odd/even or greater/less than 5) on a set of bivalent stimuli (e.g., 
single digits). Since both tasks can be performed on the same stimuli, presenting a target 
stimulus does not uniquely indicate a particular task. The to-be-performed task is 
specified on a trial-by-trial basis by providing an explicit cue prior to or concurrently 
with the stimulus onset (random-cued paradigm; Meiran, 1996), making the task order 
entirely predictable (alternating runs paradigm; Rogers & Monsell, 1995), or allowing 
subjects to determine the task order (Arrington & Logan, 2004). Performance is typically 
measured by response time (RT) and accuracy. The observed effects of manipulating
10
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various parameters such as stimulus type, intertrial intervals, etc., on repetition (i.e., AA) 
and switch (i.e., AB ) trial performance can inform theoretical constructs.
In the context of the task-switching paradigm, the specific assumptions of 
Goschke’s model can be laid out. First, the model posits that preparatory processes are 
not specific to switch trials. Rather, it predicts that a preparatory state of persistence -  
perhaps involving sustained activation of the current set and inhibition of all task- 
irrelevant information -  can facilitate performance on repetition trials. Second, the model 
proposes that switching tasks can be assisted by a general preparatory state of flexibility. 
This state may be characterized by sensitivity to information irrelevant to the current task 
and a readiness to quickly shift mental set if the need arises. Third, the model presumes 
that these preparatory states are antagonistic, such that persistence incurs a cost to 
flexibility and vice versa. In other words, experimental conditions that lead to improved 
repetition trial performance should also be associated with decrements in switch trial 
performance, and vice versa. Fourth, the model presumes that the balance between 
persistence and flexibility is regulated in response to changing environmental conditions. 
Thus, covert changes to the task context should induce an adjustment to this balance in 
order to optimize performance.
Some previously reported research findings have relevance to these assumptions. 
Consistent with the first prediction, allowing for preparation by lengthening the 
interstimulus interval (up to one second or so) speeds up RT not only on switch trials, but 
on repetition trials as well, albeit not to the same degree (Rogers & Monsell, 1995; 
Meiran, 1996). This modest benefit of preparation time is likely limited by the difficulty 
level of the tasks used in these studies, and would likely be larger if ceiling effects could
11
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be avoided. To further explore the preparatory process involved in task repetition, 
Ruthruff et al. (2001) employed the alternating runs version of the task-switching 
paradigm (i.e., AABBAA), but occasionally (on 13.3% of trials) violated the task order to 
create unexpected repetition (i.e., AABBBA) and switch (i.e., AABBAB) trials. They 
used two sets of univalent stimuli, each with four possible responses mapped on to two 
keys. The response-stimulus interval was 1500 - 1700 ms, allowing for adequate 
preparation time. Repetition trials were performed faster than switch trials (a repetition 
main effect) and expected tasks were performed faster than unexpected tasks (a 
probability main effect). Importantly, these two factors did not interact. That is, 
foreknowledge of the upcoming task/trial type similarly facilitated repetition and switch 
trial performance, indicating that time-consuming preparatory processes are involved in 
both trial types. Another study compared conditions with predictable versus random 
task-ordering and found that foreknowledge of the upcoming task (possible only in the 
predictably ordered block) sped up RT similarly on both repetition and switch trials 
(Sohn & Carlson, 1998). All of these findings are in line with the first assumption of 
Goschke’s model -  that preparatory processes are not specific to switch trials.
With regard to the second assumption, helpful preparation for switch trials is 
suggested by the common finding that switch trials are performed faster at longer 
interstimulus intervals. In their seminal paper, Rogers and Monsell (1995) showed that 
switch costs decrease (i.e., the relative RT advantage for repetition trials over switch 
trials diminished) with increasing response-stimulus intervals, and eventually leveled out 
at about 600 ms. This benefit from preparation time has been replicated several times in 
other paradigms (Arrington & Logan, 2004; Kray & Lindenberger, 2000; Meiran, 1996;
12
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but see Koch, 2003), and has been interpreted to reflect active preparation for the 
upcoming switch trial via time-consuming executive control processes (Rogers & Mosell, 
1995) or passive decay of interference from the previous trial (Allport, Styles, & Hsieh,
1994). Because the duration of the preparation period was confounded with remoteness 
from the previous trial in both Allport et al.’s (1994) and Rogers and Monsell’s (1995) 
studies, the effect of reduced switch costs could not be unequivocally attributed to active 
preparation or passive decay. To resolve this, Meiran (1996) used the random-cued 
paradigm, in which these factors can be unconfounded. He found that switch costs were 
reduced by lengthening the cue-stimulus interval (CSI), thereby unequivocally 
demonstrating that active preparation prior to task execution was at least partly 
responsible for the RT reduction. Meiran, Chorev, and Sapir (2000) expanded on this 
finding by showing that both active reconfiguration and passive decay of the previous 
task set contributed to the reduction of switching costs with preparation time. Using the 
random-cued paradigm, they first prolonged the response-cue interval (RCI) and 
observed a switch cost reduction, consistent with passive decay. They then prolonged the 
CSI and observed a further reduction in switch costs, consistent with active preparation.
Rather than vary the amount of time to prepare, Sohn and Carlson (2000; 
Experiment 3) manipulated subjects’ knowledge about the forthcoming task. They 
compared conditions in which the task type on the forthcoming trial (letter, digit, or 
symbol classification) was entirely predictable vs. random. In both conditions, the 
upcoming trial type (repetition or switch) was entirely predictable. Note that for 
repetition trials, the upcoming task type was necessarily predefined (i.e., AA) in both 
conditions. However, for switch trials, it was not predefined in the random condition
13
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(AB  or AC, with equal probability) because the authors used three tasks. Foreknowledge 
interacted with switch cost, suggesting that knowing the specific identity of the upcoming 
task facilitated preparation over and above knowing only that a switch trial was 
forthcoming. In other words, task-specific preparation is more beneficial than generic 
preparation for switch. Since this study did not include a condition in which subjects had 
no foreknowledge of both the upcoming trial type and task type, it remains to be 
determined whether generic preparation for a switch is more beneficial than no 
preparation, which is exactly what Goschke’s model predicts.
Getting closer to this issue, Dreisbach, Haider, and Kluwe (2002) cleverly 
manipulated subjects’ trial-by-trial expectancies by providing probability cues before 
each trial. This cue indicated, with a probability of .25, .50, .75, or 1.00, which task was 
to be performed on the forthcoming trial. These authors used two sets of stimuli 
(numbers and letters), and each was associated with two different tasks (odd/even, 
greater/less than 7; consonant/vowel, before/after M). The stimuli appeared in a color 
that specified a particular task. With a RCI of 2,000 ms and a CSI of 1,500 ms,
Dreisbach et al. (2002) found that probability had similar effects on repetition and switch 
trial performance (a null interaction) -  decreasing RT with increasing probabilities. 
Repetitions were performed faster than switches across the range of probabilities. In a 
second experiment, they replicated these findings using univalent stimuli (four tasks 
associated with four unique stimulus sets). A subsequent experiment used the identical 
stimulus set as in the first experiment and probability cues that were either the same as in 
their first experiment or were only semispecific -  indicating an upcoming task-switch 
without specifying which of the three tasks was to be performed. The instruction
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indicating which of these tasks to perform came simultaneously with stimulus 
presentation. This experiment replicated the results of the first one, finding that 
probability had a similar effect on both repetition and switch trials. However, for the 
semispecific cues, the authors found an interaction between trial types -  the probability 
cues had an effect on repetition trials (as with the specific cues) but not switch trials. In a 
final experiment using the same stimuli but a broader range of probability cues (1.0, .75, 
.50, .25) and only semispecific cues, the authors similarly found linear decreases in 
repetition trial RT with increasing certainty of an upcoming repetition, but no probability 
effects for switch trials. Dreisbach et al. (2002) concluded that preparation for a task 
switch is not possible without knowledge of the specific to-be-switched-to task.
Note that a lack of preparation for upcoming switch trials without foreknowledge 
of the to-be-switched-to task is incompatible with the second assumption of Goschke’s 
model. Rather, the model posits a more general state of “readiness to switch to different 
tasks” (Goschke, 2G03, p. 70), in which individuals loosen their attentional focus on the 
current task and monitor their environment for a set-switch signal. Therefore, 
performance on a switch trial should be faster when it is anticipated versus unexpected, 
even if the to-be-switched-to task is not revealed in advance. As a real-world example, 
imagine you are reading the newspaper on a park bench. With previous knowledge that a 
serial killer is at large in the neighborhood, you would probably focus less on the 
newspaper and glance at passer-bys with greater scrutiny (i.e., a flexibility for persistence 
trade-off). Is knowledge of your action upon observation of a suspicious person (e.g., run 
away, alert the authorities on your cellular phone, pretend to keep reading, etc.) a 
necessary prerequisite for this state? Introspection suggests not.
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If preparation for a task switch without knowledge of the specific forthcoming 
task is indeed possible, one can only speculate about the processes that underlie it. Recall 
that the research literature converges on a two-stage model of task-switching that 
involves activation/retrieval of the new task and inhibition of the no-longer-appropriate 
task. Clearly, the mental set associated with a new task could not be retrieved before its 
identity has been revealed (unless subjects luckily guess or have a valid reason to expect 
a particular task, e.g., unequal probability). It is conceivable, however, that subjects 
might inhibit the mental set associated with the just-performed task in the case of an 
expected switch. This would help reduce interference with whichever task is to be 
performed on the forthcoming trial. However, there is some evidence to suggest that 
backward inhibition occurs only with activation of the new task set (Dreisbach et al., 
2002; Hubner, Dreisbach, Haider, & Kluwe, 2003; Mayr & Keele, 2000), or only with 
response-related processes (Shuch & Koch, 2003).
Mayr & Keele (2000, Experiment 3) had subjects switch to one of three tasks on 
every trial in an unpredictable order. A switch was thus guaranteed on each trial, but the 
identity of to-be-switched-to task was unknown until explicitly cued 700 ms prior to or 
simultaneously with presentation of the target stimulus. Backward inhibition -  slower 
RT when a task was performed recently versus more remotely -  was found only in the 
pre-cued condition, suggesting that knowledge of trial transition alone was insufficient to 
bring about inhibition of just-engaged mental set. Hubner et al. (2003) had participants 
switch between three tasks that were associated with three sets of univalent stimuli. 
Stimulus presentation was sometimes preceded by task cues (presented 500 ms following 
a response) that either specified the forthcoming task or merely that a switch was
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forthcoming. The target stimulus then appeared 1500 ms later flanked by stimuli from 
either the preceding task or a control task, or not flanked. Interference from flankers was 
reduced by the specific tasks cues, but not by the cues merely indicating a task switch 
without specifying the to-be-performed task in advance. Taken together, it appears that 
knowledge of the specific forthcoming task is required for backward inhibition.
If not activation/retrieval of the new set or backward inhibition, what processes 
could facilitate unspecific preparation for a task switch? Goschke (2000; 2003; Gruber & 
Goschke, 2004) states that enhanced sensitivity to potentially relevant novel stimuli may 
be achieved by lowering the threshold of accessibility to working memory. In the task- 
switching paradigm, enhanced sensitivity may involve a bias to process one attribute of 
bivalent stimuli, such as the letter in the stimulus “G4” if the odd/even task was just 
performed and a task-switch is expected to be forthcoming. Desimone & Duncan (1995) 
provide a mechanism for how this might be achieved, at least in the visual domain: an 
“attentional template” biases processing in the visual cortex to selective stimulus 
properties or to screen out unwanted stimulus features (e.g., shape, color, location). 
Interestingly, in the Dreisbach et al. (2002) study that found no evidence for a general 
preparatory state, the experimental design may have disallowed this possibility by using 
four tasks that were associated with two stimulus sets, letters and numbers. Therefore, 
with foreknowledge of a task switch, selective attention to one aspect of the stimulus 
(e.g., numbers) would not be advantageous. As a result, their conclusion that “unspecific 
preparation for a task shift does not seem possible” (Dreisbach et al., 2002, p. 480) may 
be premature.
Another plausible means for unspecific task-switch preparation may be to keep all
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potential mental sets partially activated (Gruber & Goschke, 2004). A theoretical 
foundation for this hypothesis is found in guided activation theory (Cohen et al., 2004; 
Miller & Cohen, 2001) and its elaborations (e.g., Gilbert & Shallice, 2002), which 
propose that partial activation facilitates responding to a particular stimulus attribute by 
lowering the activation threshold for the mental set associated with that attribute. Thus, 
potentially relevant mental sets will require less stimulus-driven activation to be loaded 
into working memory, and so will be more readily selected over competing mental sets. 
This theory, however, has not been extended to account for partial activation of multiple 
(competing) sets, a situation that may cause crosstalk and thus be maladaptive (Ruthruff 
et al., 2001), as mentioned earlier. In conclusion, research to date has not been able to 
demonstrate clear evidence of a general “flexibility” state (the second assumption of 
Goschke’s model), nor delineate the cognitive processes that characterize it.
Nevertheless, several possibilities are tenable, and will be explored in the present study.
A few studies have also examined the trade-off between persistence and 
flexibility, the third assumption of Goschke’s model. Dreisbach & Goschke (2004) 
looked at the modulating influence of positive affect on these processes, in light of its 
prior association with increased dopaminergic transmission in the prefrontal cortex. They 
first trained subjects to respond to stimuli in a given color while ignoring stimuli in 
another color. In a second phase, subjects then had to respond to either a new color with 
distracter stimuli appearing in the previously task-relevant color (the perseveration 
condition) or respond to stimuli in the previously task-irrelevant color with distracter 
stimuli appearing in a new color (the leamed-irrelevance condition). The authors 
experimentally induced positive affective states by briefly presenting emotionally salient
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pleasant pictures just prior to the target stimulus on every trial. Compared to conditions 
in which subjects were shown neutral or negative affect-inducing pictures, these subjects 
showed reduced switch costs (second phase RT minus first phase RT) in the 
perseveration condition and increased switch costs in the leamed-irrelevance condition. 
The authors concluded that this pattern indicates increased flexibility at the expense of 
distractibility. Dreisbach et al. (2005) applied this same paradigm to healthy individuals 
who differed on neurobiological markers of central dopaminergic function. Two 
indicators of elevated dopamine levels, high spontaneous blink rates and the presence of 
the DRD4 exon E l 4/7 genotype, were associated with increased flexibility but reduced 
persistence. Yogev, Hadar, Gutman, and Sirota (2003), apparently unaware of Goschke’s 
model, developed a paradigm similar to the WCST that measured both perseveration and 
distractibility. Relative to controls, schizophrenics with mostly negative symptoms 
tended to commit more perseverative errors whereas those with mostly positive 
symptoms evidenced over-switching, as measured by a ratio between the number of 
switching responses to the total number of trials. Together, these studies provide 
evidence that dopamine activity modulates the flexibility-persistence balance. However, 
of potential importance, so-called flexibility-persistence trade-offs in each of these 
studies were observed between-subjects or within-subjects but under different 
experimental conditions, rather than simultaneously within the same subjects. In other 
words, flexibility- and persistence-related processes were not demonstrated to be truly 
anatagonistic.
The least progress has been made towards the model’s fourth prediction -  the 
persistence-flexibility balance is context-sensitive such that adjustments are made on-line
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in response to changing task demands. To date, only explicit external cues have been 
used to manipulate task context (e.g., Dreisbach et al., 2002), easing the demands on 
exogenously driven processes. In order to adequately test this hypothesis, one would 
need to demonstrate that subjects engage in preparatory processes to facilitate repetition 
or switch trial performance, whichever is most adaptive, without being overtly instructed 
to do so on a trial by trial basis. This is another aim of the present study.
In summary, executive control research to date has primarily focused on the 
discrete process of a task shift -  the “reconfiguration” involved in disengaging from one 
task and switching to another. Clearly, adaptive functioning in the real world requires not 
only the ability to shift our attention when instructed, but also to identify when it is 
appropriate to shift versus maintain focus and implement these adjustments as we go 
about novel goal-directed behavior. The next step in executive control research, then, 
must be to characterize the brain systems that regulate the balance between set-switching 
and set-maintenance, and theoretically integrate this system with existing models of 
executive functioning (e.g., Norman & Shallice, 1986; Miller & Cohen, 2001). Goschke 
has taken an important step in this direction by proposing a theoretical account for how 
the persistence-flexibility balance is dynamically regulated. This model is broadly 
consistent with most available cognitive and neurophysiological research to date. 
However, several of its fundamental assumptions have been subjected to little direct 
empirical inquiry, and the model therefore remains “speculative” (Goschke, 2000, p.
351). The main goal of the present study is to empirically evaluate Goschke’s theory by 
testing its assumptions in a task-switching paradigm. The present results may also force 
expansion of computational models of executive control (Cohen et al., 2004; Gilbert &
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Shallice, 2002) to accommodate more than two mental sets, or “task demand units,” and 
clarify some previous equivocal empirical findings (e.g., Dreisbach et al., 2002). Other 
potential benefits of this research include improving the clinical assessment of executive 
control and helping to characterize attention deficits in various clinical populations. 
Individuals with Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder, for example, may be capable 
of persistence and flexibility but unable to infer the optimal balance and so maintain set 
when it is counterproductive (i.e., perseverate) and switch set when focus is needed (i.e., 
show distractibility).
To evaluate the four main assumptions of Goschke’s model outlined above, I used 
the random-cued version of the task-switching paradigm1 and manipulated participants’ 
expectancies about the forthcoming trial (what to prepare for) to encourage persistence- 
or flexibility-related preparatory processes. Since explicit cues indicating the probability 
of an upcoming task (as in Dreisbach et al., 2002) are largely nonexistent outside the 
laboratory and ease the demands on executive control, I wished to develop a more 
ecologically valid paradigm in which the task context could be altered without explicitly 
instructing subjects to modify their preparatory strategy on a trial by trial basis. One way 
to do this is to manipulate the frequency and thus subjective probability of 
switch/repetition trials. When repetition trials are relatively common, set- 
maintenance/persistence related processes should be active during the RCI. When switch 
trials are common, deploying set-shifting/flexibility related processes during each RCI 
would maximize efficiency on most trials.
1 Even though the random-cued version o f the task-switching paradigm is not generally associated with top- 
down control (Logan & Bundensen, 2003), manipulating participants’ expectancies regarding the 
forthcoming trial and lengthening the RCI will allow for the activation o f top-down processes prior to the 
task cue (i.e., during the RCI).
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General Method
Participants
All participants were undergraduate students at the University of Windsor and 
were awarded bonus course credit as compensation. They spoke English fluently and did 
not meet any of the following exclusion criteria (by self-report): (1) history of head 
trauma or other neurological illness, (2) formal diagnosis of learning disability or 
Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder, (3) current mood, anxiety, or psychotic 
disorder, (4) color blindness.
Materials
The stimulus set resembled the WCST (Grant & Berg, 1948) cards. They were 
comprised of boxes containing geometric figures that differed on three dimensions: color 
(red, yellow, blue, and green), shape (square, circle, triangle, and plus sign), and number 
(one to four). Four reference stimuli were made up of orthogonal combinations of the 
three dimensions: one green square, two blue plus signs, three red circles, and four 
yellow triangles. These are shown in Figure 1. The experimental task was to match 
target stimuli to the correct reference stimulus based on a specified dimension (e.g., 
color). The target stimuli were 24 unique combinations of the three dimensions that 
shared attributes with three out of the four reference stimuli2. Thus, each target stimulus 
was the same color as one of the reference stimuli, the same shape as another, the same 
number as a third, and bore no resemblance to the last one (e.g., see Figure 1). Since the 
task-irrelevant features (e.g., color and number if the shape task is cued) are always 
associated with different responses, they can be considered “incompatible noise” (Gratton
2 All possible combinations o f four levels o f the three dimensions (color, shape, and number) yield 64 
distinct stimuli. Four of these are identical to the reference stimuli, 36 overlap with two of the reference 
stimuli, and 24 (those retained for the present study) overlap with three o f the reference stimuli.
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et a l, 1992).
The four reference stimuli, presented just below each target stimulus in a 400 X 
560 pixel display with a white background, corresponded to four keyboard keys (C, V, B, 
and N). This (topographically congruent) mapping is also illustrated in Figure 1. To 
indicate a match between a target and the “four yellow triangles” reference stimulus, for 
example, participants would press the “N” key. Stimulus presentation and data collection 
were achieved through SuperLab software (Cedrus Corporation), run on an IBM Pentium 
II desktop computer.
Procedure
The experiment began with written and oral instructions on how to perform each 
of the tasks and the response-keyboard mappings. Participants then performed a practice 
pure-block containing 20 trials for each of the three tasks (color, shape, number) and then 
a practice mixed-block of 60 trials in which task order was random (i.e., 120 practice 
trials in total). All of these blocks had a CSI of 100 ms and a RCI of 300 ms. After each 
response, feedback about its accuracy was provided. If correct, the word “CORRECT’ 
was displayed for 200 ms. If incorrect, the word “INCORRECT’ was similarly displayed. 
Note that this 200 ms was part of the 300 ms RCI.
For the test phase, participants performed several different blocks in a 
counterbalanced order, each 160 trials in length, with equal representation of the three 
task types (i.e., approximately 53 trials of each of the color, shape, and number task).
The CSI was held constant at 100 ms, as to not allow for post-cue preparation (see 
Meiran, 1996). That is, any preparatory processes will have to be carried out before the 
presentation of the cue indicating which task is forthcoming (and therefore should not be
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task-specific in the case of switch trials). All participants completed a block with 75% 
switches (and 25% repetitions; referred to as the “high-switch block” hereafter) and one 
with 25% switches (and 75% repetitions; “high-repetition block”). Both had a RCI of 
1000 ms, which has been shown to be adequate for preparation in the task-switching 
paradigm (Rogers & Monsell, 1995). One second has also been shown to be optimal in 
prepared RT paradigms (e.g., Stuss et al., 2005). Participants were encouraged to briefly 
rest in between the blocks.
Trials proceeded as follows. After the RCI, a cue appeared in the middle of the 
screen to indicate the forthcoming task {COLOR, SHAPE, or NUMBER). 100 ms later, 
the stimulus appeared just above the cue and both remained on the screen until a response 
was made. The four reference stimuli were always presented just below the cue, in the 
same relative location as the keyboard responses. When a response was pressed, the cue, 
target stimulus, and reference stimuli all immediately disappeared, signaling the onset of 
the next RCI. A fixation cross appeared on the screen at the location of the task name for 
the duration of the RCI. No feedback was provided during this phase of the experiment. 
This sequence of events is depicted in Figure 2.
Following completion of the experimental blocks, participants were asked several 
questions as part a manipulation check (see Appendix A) and then debriefed.
Data Analysis
The dependent variables were RT and error rate, measuring speed and accuracy, 
respectively. Trials were classified as “repetition” trials if the immediately preceding 
trial (N - 1) involved the same task and as “switch” trials if the N - 1 task was different. 
Average RT and error rates were computed separately for these two trial types, for each
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participant, at each combination of levels of the independent variables. Because a 
preliminary exploration of the data revealed that RTs were positively skewed, within and 
across blocks, the median was thought to be a more appropriate measure of central 
tendency. This made the standard practice of deleting outlier trials with an arbitrary cut­
off (e.g., with RT > 3000 ms) superfluous. The percentage of errors was also moderately 
positively skewed and so was transformed via a square root function.
When discussed below, the assumptions for all parametric statistical tests were 
met except where explicitly stated otherwise. The methodological design ensured equal 
sample sizes and independence of observations. Departures from univariate and 
multivariate normality were corrected with data transformations as necessary. In cases 
where the assumption of sphericity was not met (Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity was 
significant at p  < .05), the degrees of freedom were adjusted to a more conservative level 
based on the Greenhouse-Geisser estimate of epsilon. For the analyses that included a 
between-subjects factor (block order), any heterogeneity of covariance matrices was 
modest at worst, and should not be problematic given the equal group sizes.
Alpha was set at .05 for omnibus tests. Bonferroni-corrected t-tests were used for 
pairwise comparisons because they are reasonably powerful when only a small number of 
contrasts are performed and yet they keep the family wise alpha level at or below .05, 
even with severe violations of the sphericity assumption (Stevens, 2002). For planned 
comparisons, alpha was corrected for the number of pairwise tests performed, whereas 
for post-hoc tests, alpha was corrected for all possible pairwise contrasts.
Also of note, Cohen’s d  was always computed using the pooled standard 
deviation in the denominator, and the 95% confidence intervals surrounding each mean
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RT value in Figures 5 and 6 were computed using Loftus and Mason’s (1994) formula for 
multifactor within-subjects designs, separately for repetition and switch trials.
In each experiment, an outlier analysis was first conducted to identify any 
participants who may not be representative of the sample, possibly due to inadequate 
motivation, somnolence, an unreported neurocognitive disorder, or some other factor. 
Next, a set of exclusion criteria was applied to the trials. The first ten trials of each block 
were excluded because they were considered a “warm-up” period in which subjects 
would presumably establish expectancies based on their perceptions of the relative 
frequency of task repetitions and task switches that would guide the response strategies 
for the remaining 150 trials of the block. This accounted for a loss of 6.3% of the data. 
Trials that were errors or immediately followed errors were not analyzed for speed 
(overall error rates were 6.3%, 7.8%, and 6.9% for Experiments 1, 2, and 3, respectively). 
This was due to the fact that the task performed on error trials could not be known, and 
therefore their classification as repetition or switch trials could not be determined; since 
this classification is based on concordance (or discordance) between the present trial and 
the N - 1 trial, trials immediately following errors could also not be classified.
Switch trials will be referred to as probable switches in the high-switch blocks 
and as improbable switches in the high-repetition blocks because the global probability of 
a switch trial is high and low in these blocks, respectively. Correspondingly, repetition 
trials will be referred to as probable repetitions in the high-repetition blocks and as 
improbable repetitions in the high-switch blocks.
Experiment 1
To ensure the involvement of executive control in task preparation, the paradigm
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must make it so that preparatory processes have to be endogenously triggered rather than 
explicitly cued. As mentioned above, the task-context could covertly change to promote 
shifts towards either end of the persistence-flexibility spectrum with an unwarned 
blockwise manipulation of the repetition:switch trial ratio. Encoding frequency
- i
information is automatic (Hasher & Zacks, 1979; 1984) . It is resilient to normal aging 
(Sanders, Wise, Liddle, & Murphy, 1990) and even dementia of the Alzheimer’s type 
(Wiggs, Martin, & Sunderland, 1997). Previous studies have shown that participants can 
make use of frequency information to optimize their performance through strategic 
processing (e.g., Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992; Logan & Zbrodoff, 1979). Therefore, 
a high frequency of repetition trials (relative to switch trials) should promote persistence- 
related processes during each RCI, whereas a high frequency of switch trials (relative to 
repetition trials) should promote flexibility-related processes during each RCI.
A potential problem with this paradigm is the possible confound between the 
frequency of each trial type and practice effects (Dreisbach et al., 2002). By varying the 
frequency of switch trials within a block, the amount of practice with switch and 
repetition trials was also varied. Though participants will have performed the same 
number of trials of each type by the end of the experiment, they will be differentially 
practiced with repetition and switch trials at most points during the experiment. No 
confound is anticipated based on previous research examining practice effects by 
comparing repeated trials within a run or by comparing blocks over the course of the 
experiment. Specifically, Rogers & Monsell (1995) found no evidence for micropractice 
effects within a run of repetition trials. Mean RT for the first, second, and third repetition 
in a run did not differ. Additionally, Meiran (1996) demonstrated that extensive practice
3 But can be improved by conscious processing (Sanders, Gonzalez, Murphy, Liddle, & Vitina, 1987).
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produces linear decreases in shift costs when no preparation time (defined as the CSI) is 
provided, but no practice effects were observed when the CSI was long. Therefore, it 
seems that cue-stimulus associations become strengthened with long-term practice, but 
preparatory processes do not get more efficient (Meiran, 1996). Another study found 
decreasing RTs with increasing practice but a null interaction between practice and trial 
type (switch versus repetition; Dreisbach et al., 2002). In spite of this evidence, to be 
safe, any effect of long-term practice in the present study was eliminated by 
counterbalancing (see Methods section). Also, the design of the present study allows for 
an evaluation of the magnitude of practice effects, since predictions based on practice 
effects run counter to some of the hypotheses4.
The blocks with disproportions of switch and repetition trials were compared to a 
control block that has an equal ratio of switch and repetition trials. Setting the probability 
of a switch/repetition to 50% should remove the predictability of task order and thus deny 
subjects foreknowledge of what to prepare for (a repetition or switch). With no 
foreknowledge of trial order, participants could adopt three different strategies during the 
RCI (Sohn & Carlson, 1998). They could (1) maintain set on every trial and be well 
prepared for repetitions but very slow for switches, (2) guess at the next task and prepare 
for a switch to that task, leaving them in a good position if that task happens to come, but 
in poor shape otherwise, or (3) not prepare and simply wait for the cue. Participants can 
be expected to adopt the latter approach based on previous research (e.g., Sohn &
Carlson, 1998) and also because it is most effective overall (Gratton et al., 1992).
4 For example, consider the administration o f one block with frequent switches followed by another with 
infrequent switches. Having just completed the frequent-switching block, subjects would be 
disproportionately practiced with switch trials. Consequently, switch costs in the subsequent (low  
frequency) block should be small. However, switch costs would be predicted to be large in the second 
block on the basis o f  Goschke’s theory.
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Contrasts between this equal-proportioned block and the high-repetition/switch blocks 
should elucidate the distinctions between preparing to repeat/switch, not preparing to 
repeat/switch, and preparing to not repeat/switch.
Method
Participants
Twenty undergraduate students at the University of Windsor voluntarily 
participated in this study. They ranged in age from 18 to 27 years (median = 19). The 
majority (84%) were female.
Procedure
After completing the practice phase (described above), participants worked 
through the high-switch and high-repetition blocks in a counterbalanced order, before (n 
= 10) or after (n = 10) the equal-proportioned block. RCI was always 1000 ms. This 
made for a 3 (block) X 2 (trial type) design. Participants were not informed of the 
blockwise manipulation. Rather, each block was introduced in the same generic manner, 
e.g., “here is the next block.” Therefore, the block-to-block transitions should have been 
viewed as mere breaks in a long experiment rather than the end of one set of experimental 
conditions and the beginning of different conditions.
Results
Data screening
Boxplots of global (across all blocks) mean RTs identified one subject as a clear 
outlier. This participant fell 5.94 standard deviations above the sample mean. 
Interestingly, he reported being only “6 out of 10” concerned with answering as fast as he 
could on the manipulation check questionnaire, which was markedly different from the
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rest of the sample {M = 8.1, SD = 1.1). This suggests insufficient motivation or an 
inordinately strong accuracy-for-speed tradeoff. Regardless, this subject was excluded 
from the analyses reported below.
Preliminary Analyses
Practice blocks. The practice blocks were first subjected to analysis. A one-way 
within-subjects ANOVA with task-type as the independent variable produced a 
significant main effect, F(1.36, 24.41) = 51.94, p  < .00001, r\p2 = .743. Bonferroni- 
corrected paired t-tests revealed significant differences between the shape block and the 
other two blocks (both p  < .00001), but no difference between the color and number 
blocks (p = .994). Errors were very infrequent and extremely positively skewed (most 
participants made no errors). Since all participants completed these three practice blocks 
in the same order, blockwise comparisons may be complicated by practice effects, and 
more likely, proactive/retroactive interference. Therefore, the enticing conclusion that 
the shape task was more difficult than the other two tasks must be withheld for now.
The 60-trial mixed practice block was analyzed next. According to a paired t-test, 
repetition trials were performed faster than switch trials, f(18) = 2.79, p  = .012, Cohen’s d  
= .414. Participants also made more errors on switch trials compared with repetition 
trials, t(18) = 4.88, p  = .00012, Cohen’s d  = 1.346. In other words, both the RT and error 
rate data supported significant switch cost effects. A one-way within-subjects ANOVA 
with post-hoc tests revealed a main effect for task type [F(2, 36) = 18.19, p < .00001, r|p2 
= .503]. It also showed that the shape task was performed slower than the color and 
number tasks (both p  < .0001), which did not differ from each other (p = .499). This 
finding further lends credence to the hypothesis that the shape task was harder than the
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other two tasks. Visual inspection of box-plots of RT by trial number for this block (see 
Figure 3) did not reveal a linearly decreasing trend, suggesting trivial within-block 
practice effects.
Although the same practice blocks were administered in subsequent experiments, 
there is no reason to believe that the results would be any different. The above analyses 
were therefore not repeated for each experiment.
Replication o f basic task-switching phenomena. To ensure that there was nothing 
peculiar about the stimulus set, stimulus-response mappings, matching tasks, or other 
idiosyncrasies of the method employed in this study, I first examined whether some 
common findings in the literature would replicate. In virtually all previous studies 
employing the random-cued version of the task-switching paradigm, the proportion of 
repetition and switch trials is equal. It therefore seems appropriate to attempt to replicate 
major findings from these studies by analyzing only the equal-proportioned block in the 
present study.
The most robust finding in these studies is a large switch cost -  switch trials are 
performed slower than repetition trials (e.g., Meiran, 1996), even when the RCI exceeds 
one second (Meiran et al., 2000). This hypothesis was tested with a dependent samples t- 
test, which revealed a significant switch cost of about 100 ms, t(18) = 4.01, p  = .001, 
Cohen’s d  = .775. The same contrast with the square-root transformed error rates was not 
quite significant, t{ 18) = 1.64, p  = .118, Cohen’s d  = .369.
The correct response on a repetition trial may be the same or different from the 
correct response on the preceding trial. That is, participants may be required to repeat 
tasks and responses or repeat tasks but press a different response. The same is true for
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switch trials. To examine the effect of repeating versus switching responses and its 
potential interaction with repeating versus switching tasks, these variables were entered 
into a response type by trial type within-subjects ANOVA (for their descriptive statistics, 
see Table 1). There was a large main effect for trial type [F(l, 18) = 27.14, p  < .00006, 
T]p2 = .601; repetitions < switches], no main effect for response type [F(l, 18) = .70, p  = 
.413, rip2 = .038; repetitions = switches], and a large interaction effect [F(l, 18) = 21.16, p  
= .0002, rip2 = .540]. The latter indicated that response repetitions were facilatory for task 
repetitions but inhibitory for task switches. For the same ANOVA with error data, there 
was only a small main effect for response repetition [F(l, 18) = 6.25, p  = .022, tiP2 =
.258], indicating that errors were higher for response repetitions than response switches. 
Roger and Monsell (1995) obtained these same RT findings, and offered a few tentative 
explanations for why they appear. Responding to a stimulus may increase the 
association between the relevant stimulus attribute category and response while 
decreasing the association between that response and other stimulus attributes. 
Alternatively, a mechanism may exist that is designed to prevent perseverative 
responding. This system might check the planned response against the just-executed 
response, and if a match is detected, a time-consuming rechecking of the decision would 
be triggered; repetition priming would more than overcome these inhibitory effects on 
repetition trials.
An effect of task recency is another seminal finding (Ruthruff et al., 2001). 
Ruthruff and colleagues realized that switch trials differ with respect to how recently the 
switched-to task was performed, varying from a minimum of 2 trials ago to 10 or more in 
many task-switching experiments. They deconstructed the binary repetition-switch trial
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distinction, instead classifying trials based on the number of preceding trials since the 
task was last performed (i.e., task recency = 1 for repetitions trials and task recency > 1 
for switch trials). The authors found a significant effect for task recency -  RT increased 
linearly with the number of trials since the task was last performed. However, they used 
univalent stimuli (non-overlapping stimulus sets associated with the different tasks), and 
there is good reason to speculate that this finding would not replicate with multivalent 
stimuli (as in the present study). By their own admission, a consequence of using 
univalent stimuli was that “participants presumably never had to inhibit processing of the 
inappropriate task” (pg. 1415). With multi-affordance stimuli, backward inhibition is 
needed to reduce proactive interference (e.g., Mayr & Keele, 2000). The effects of 
backward inhibition may offset or even outweigh any beneficial effect of task repetition. 
Consistent with this hypothesis, Figure 4a seems to shows a switch cost (difference 
between 1 and 2), but no strong trend of linearly increasing RTs from 2 to 5 (within 
switch trials). There is also no such trend in the error data (see Figure 4b).
As highlighted in the analysis of the practice blocks, the three tasks do not appear 
to have been equal in difficulty. Moreover, unequal tasks may show asymmetrical 
switching costs (Allport et al., 1994). A task type by trial type (3 x 2) within-subjects 
ANOVA revealed large main effects for task type [F(2, 18) = 58.78, p < .00001, r|p2 = 
.874] and trial type [F(l, 18) = 18.28,p  = .00046, r|p2 = .504], as well as an interaction 
effect, F(2, 17) = 5.40, p  = .015, riP2 = .389. Follow-up post-hoc tests revealed that shape 
task was performed slower than the color [/(18) = 11.11 ,p <  .00001, Cohen’s d  = 1.593] 
and number [f(18) = 8.67, p  < .00001, Cohen’s d = 1.442] tasks, and that the latter two 
did not differ, t(18) = .43, p  = .68, Cohen’s d  = .061. Post-hoc exploration of the
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interaction effect revealed that the only significant difference was between the switch 
cost for the number and color tasks, r(18) = 3.45, p  = .003, Cohen’s d  = .783. Descriptive 
statistics are presented in Table 2. Errors were too infrequent and extremely positively 
skewed, so only group means are reported. Switch costs appear smallest for the color 
task, largest for the number task, and intermediate for the shape task. Allport et al.
(1994) suggested that more overleamed task sets (e.g., reading words) require greater 
backward inhibition than novel task sets (e.g., naming the color of the ink words are 
printed in), and are therefore harder to switch back to, since this extra inhibition must be 
overcome. It is not intuitively obvious why classifying objects based on their quantity, 
by this account, is a more overleamed task than classifying them based on their shape, 
and so on. This is especially odd given that the difficulty gradient (in terms of overall 
RT) for these three tasks followed a different pattern. Importantly, the task distribution 
was balanced in all experimental blocks, so even widely discrepant switch costs would 
not systematically influence the below results.
Main Analyses
RT data. Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 3. A 3 (block) X 2 (trial
type) within-subjects ANOVA revealed a main effect for trial type [F(l, 18) = 41.06, p < 
2  ♦ ♦.00001, rjp = .695], indicating that repetitions were performed faster than switches. The 
main effect for block was not significant [F(2, 17) = .31, p  = .741, r\p2 = .035], suggesting 
that the overall mean RT for high-switch, equal-proportioned, and high-repetition blocks 
did not differ. There was also a robust interaction effect [F(2, 17) = 16.90, p  = .00009, 
r)p = .665], plotted in Figure 5. This interaction reflected decreasing switch costs with 
increasing probability of a switch trial -  they were 182, 104, and 74 ms in the high-
34
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
repetition, equal-proportioned, and high-switch blocks, respectively. Planned 
comparisons were used to examine the probability effects more closely. Only the mean 
repetition RTs for the high-switch and high-repetition blocks significantly differed, t{ 18) 
= 3.17, p  = .005, Cohen’s d  = .545. That is, probable repetitions were performed faster 
than improbable repetitions. All other comparisons were in the predicted numerical 
direction, but non-significant at a Bonferonni-corrected alpha of .017.
In most paradigms (including the present one), repetition and switch trials are 
defined by the immediately preceding trial, ignoring events before it. A given trial is 
simply classified as a repetition trial if the previous trial involved the same task and is 
classified as a switch trial if the previous trial involved a different task. This method 
equates repetition trials that are preceded by one, two, three, or more trials involving the 
same task, which may be inappropriate if there are systematic RTs trends within runs of 
repetitions or switches (Meiran et al., 2000). In the present data set, however, there was a 
small effect size between the mean RT for the first trial of a run of repetitions and later 
trials in a run (averaged), Cohen’s d  = 0.237. The effect size for the same comparison, 
but with switch trials, was only 0.002. Spearman’s rho correlations between RT and 
position in a run (as a continuous variable) were also very low, -.126 for repetition and - 
.015 for switch trials. Since RT did not appear to systematically differ by position in a 
run for either repetition or switch trials, omitting trials after the first position in the run 
should have little effect on the results. When they were omitted, the same pattern of 
results was obtained. Specifically, a within-subjects ANOVA revealed a main effect for 
trial type [F(l, 18) = 31.27, p  = .00003, r|p2 = .635], a non-significant main effect for 
block [F(2, 17) = .42, p  = .664, r|p2 = .047], and a strong interaction effect, F{2, 17) =
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6.21, p  = .009, rip2 = .422. For these reasons, all subsequent analyses will include trials in 
any position of a run, i.e. adopt the standard definition of repetition and switch trials. 
Another reason for this decision is that limiting measurement of performance on 
repetition trials to the first trial of a run will underestimate the switch cost whenever task 
order is not fixed (Monsell, Sumner, & Waters, 2003), as in the present paradigm.
Because expectancy may well carry over from one block to the next, experimental 
block order should be analyzed as another independent variable. Participants who 
completed the high-switch before the high-repetition block were compared to those who 
completed these two blocks in the opposite order. In a block X trial type X block order 
split-plot ANOVA (the equal-proportioned block was not included in this analysis to 
enhance interpretability), the only significant main effect was for trial type, F( 1, 17) = 
45.72, p  < .00001, rip2 = .729. In contrast, RT did not differ by block [F(l, 17) = .55, p  = 
.466, rip2 = .032] or block order [F(l, 17) = .62, p  = .44, r|p2= .035], The block by trial 
type interaction was significant, F (l, 17) = 32.91, p < .00001, rip2 = .659, but the other 
two-way interactions were both p > .05. The three-way interaction was also non­
significant [F(l, 17) = 1.23, p  = .283, r\p2 = .067], suggesting that the probability effects 
were similar for both block orders. However, post-hoc tests revealed isolated probability 
effects for switch trials in the subsample that completed the high-repetition block first 
[r(8) = 4.45, p  = .002, Cohen’s d  = 1.00], and isolated probability effects for repetition 
trials in the subsample that completed the high-switch block first [f(9) = 3.40, p  = .008, 
Cohen’s d = .681].
One possible line of explanation to account for this finding is that subjects who 
performed the high-switch block first may have reached ceiling levels on switch trials
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and so benefited no further in the second block, whereas their performance on repetition 
trials (of which they performed few in the first block) improved in the subsequent high- 
repetition condition. Likewise, subjects who performed the high-repetition block first 
may have achieved ceiling RT on repetition trials but not switch trials, and then showed 
improvement only on switch trials in the second block. Of course, this would only be 
plausible if practice effects were minimal for the less frequent trial type within the first 
block and then substantial within the second block, when that trial type was more 
frequent. The data do not support this hypothesis. The high-switch and high-repetition 
blocks were divided into quarters. Because there were not enough valid trials (only about 
5 to 7, on average) to compute reliable means for a within-subject analysis, only the 
group level data was analyzed. Means for the groups who performed the high-repetition 
block first and the high-switch block first were computed for the second (46th to 80th trial) 
and fourth (116th to 150th trial) quarters of each block, separately for repetitions and 
switches. A practice effect would be indicated by a significant RT decrease from the 
second to the forth quarter. Within-block RT differences were small and inconsistent 
(some in the numerical direction of practice effects and others in the direction of fatigue 
effects). Alternative explanations are explored in Experiment 3.
Error rates. The block by trial type within-subjects ANOVA revealed a main 
effect for trial type [F(l, 18) = 11.84, p  = .003, qp2 = .397] but not block [F(2, 17) = 1.66, 
p  = .22, r)p2 = .164], The interaction effect was also significant, F(2, 17) = 4.54, p  = .026, 
rip = .348. None of the pairwise contrasts reached significance. Of note, the numerical 
trends for the (transformed) error rates were in the opposite direction as predicted (and 
the RT findings) -  switch costs were largest in the high-switch block (1.2% error rate
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difference), and smaller in the equal-proportioned (.4%) and high-repetition (.3%) blocks, 
suggesting that a speed-accuracy tradeoff may contribute to (but not fully explain) the 
RT results. As with the RT data, excluding all trials that were not in the first position of a 
run did not significantly alter the results. A block X trial type X block order split-plot 
ANOVA revealed that block order did not influence the probability effects.
Errors on switch trials can be classified as perseverative or non-perseverative (i.e., 
random) in a similar manner to the WCST. An incorrect response on a switch trial is 
classified as perseverative if it would have been correct for the task cued on the previous 
trial5. Such an error may occur as the result of maintaining set during the RCI and getting 
“caught” erroneously applying this set to the forthcoming target stimulus, i.e., performing 
the no-longer-appropriate task. Since there are three possible incorrect response 
alternatives on a given switch trial, the chance probability of an error being of the 
perseverative type is about 33%. The percentage of all switch trial errors that were 
perseverative errors were calculated for each block: 48.1% in the high-switch block, 
68.4% in the equal-proportioned block, and 69.5% in the high-repetition block.
According to chi-square tests, the high-switch block significantly differed from the equal- 
proportioned block ft2 (1) = 10.05, p  = .0015], but the equal-proportioned block did not 
differ from the high-repetition block f t2 (1) = .02, p  = .882], Thus, perseverative errors 
were far more common in the blocks where repetitions occurred with at least equal 
frequency to switches. Of note, all of these values fell outside of the 95% confidence 
intervals of the binomial distributions based on a .33 probability of a perseveration and
5 It should be noted that Meiran & Daichman (2005) appropriately criticized this method o f classifying 
errors. They argued that a so-called perseverative error (as classified above) may indeed be an instance of 
correctly performing the incorrect task, however, it may also indicate an incorrect response to the correct 
task -  there is no way to tell the difference.
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where the number of events was the total number of errors committed (which varied 
across the blocks). In fact, the binomial probability of obtaining the observed number of 
perseverative errors was less .001 for all three blocks.
Manipulation check. When asked if they noticed any differences between the 
different parts (blocks) of the experiment, only one quarter (26%) reported a difference in 
the proportion of repetition and switch trials.
Summary of Main Findings
In the present experiment, the probability of a switch/repetition was covertly 
manipulated within-subjects. The pattern of RTs indicated an interaction between 
probability of a switch/repetition and trial type (switch vs. repetition), with large and 
statistically robust switch costs (182 ms) in the high-repetition block and negligible 
switch costs (74 ms) in the high-switch block. Detailed exploration of this interaction 
revealed probability effects (probable RT < improbable RT) for repetitions, but not 
switches. RTs for unpredictable repetition trials fell intermediate to probable and 
improbable repetition trials, but were not statistically distinguishable from them. Switch 
trials exhibited the same pattern. When block order was added as a between-subjects 
variable, it modified the pattern (but not the magnitude) of the probability of a 
switch/repetition by trial type interaction. Specifically, isolated probability effects for 
repetition trials were found at one block order and isolated probability effects for switch 
trials were found at the other block order. Finally, perseverative errors were found to be 
less likely in the high-switch block compared to the other two blocks.
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Experiment 2
As Yeung & Monsell (2003) point out, a comparison between short and long 
interstimulus intervals is necessary to be sure participants made use of the preparation 
time. It can also rule out exogenous factors as (at least partially) explaining the pattern of 
findings in Experiment 1. If the probability effects reported above were actually 
endogenously driven, as hypothesized, they should disappear when preparation time is 
not provided, since under these conditions, participants will have some foreknowledge of 
the upcoming trial type but will not be able to make use of this knowledge, since active 
preparation is time-consuming. In statistical terms, the interaction between trial type and 
block (probability of a switch/repetition) demonstrated above (when RCI = 1000 ms) 
should not be replicated when the RCI is only 100 ms. As well, if top-down set- 
maintenance processes were responsible for the elevated rate of perseverative errors in 
the high-repetition block in Experiment 1, this type of switch error should be no more 
frequent in the high-repetition block than the high-switch block when the RCI is short.
Method
Participants
Twenty undergraduate students at the University of Windsor voluntarily 
participated in this study. They ranged in age from 18 to 23 years (median = 19). The 
majority (58%) were female.
Materials
Identical to Experiment 1.
Procedure
After completing the practice phase (described above), participants worked
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through high-switch and high-repetition blocks at an RCI of 1000 ms in a 
counterbalanced order, before (n = 10) or after (n = 10) high-switch and high-repetition 
blocks at an RCI of 100 ms, also in a counterbalanced order. As in Experiment 1, they 
were not informed of these blockwise manipulations.
Results
Data Screening
Boxplots of global (across all blocks) mean RTs did not identify any participants 
as outliers. All twenty participants were therefore retained for the analyses below.
RT Data
Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 4. A three-way completely within- 
subjects ANOVA was conducted, with trial type, percent switch, and RCI as independent 
variables. This procedure yielded significant main effects for trial type [switch > 
repetition; F (l, 19) = 67.11, p < .00001, riP2 = .779], block [high-switch > high-repetition; 
F (l, 19) = 11.41,p = .003, T|p2 = .375], and RCI [short > long; F (l, 19) = 17.33, p  = 
.00053, t|p = .477]. None of the interactions were significant, except for trial type by 
block, F (l, 19) = 9.64, p = .006, r|p = .337. To more closely examine the trial type by 
block interaction, separate 2 X 2  ANOVAs were run for each RCI. Importantly, there 
was a significant interaction at the long RCI [F(l, 19) = 12.66, p  = .002, r\p2 = .400] but 
not at the short RCI [F(l, 19) = 2.27, p = .148, r|p2 = .107]. Pairwise contrasts indicated 
that the former interaction was driven by probability effects for repetition trials [r(19) = 
4.12, p  = .001, Cohen’s d  = .748], i.e., probable repetitions for performed faster than 
improbable repetitions. Probability effects for switch trials were non-significant [f(19) = 
.04, p  = .97, Cohen’s d  = .008],
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This null probability effect for switch trials reflects an averaging of modest 
probability effects in the group that completed the high-switch block second [t(9) = 1.61, 
p  = .142, Cohen’s d  = .410] and a reverse effect for those who completed the high-switch 
block first [t(9) = 2.32, p  = .046, Cohen’s d  = .507]. Also of note, probability effects for 
repetitions were considerably stronger in the group that completed the high-repetition 
block second [t(9) = 4.71, p  = .001, Cohen’s d  = 1.20] compared to those who completed 
it first [t(9) = 1.69, p  = .126, Cohen’s d  = .387], Thus, the data for the long RCI 
conditions followed the same pattern as in Experiment 1, with block order modifying the 
nature of the interaction between block (probability of a switch/repetition) and trial type. 
Error Rates
The three-way ANOVA with transformed error data revealed main effects for 
RCI [short > long; F (l, 19) = 6.96, p = .007, r\p2 = .326], trial type [switch > repetition; 
F (l, 19) = 5.06, p = .031, rip2 = .223], but not block [F(l, 19) = .32, p  = .488, r)p2 = .025], 
The trial type by block [F(l, 19) = 5.27, p = .033, riP2 = .217] and trial type by block by 
RCI [F(l, 19) = 4.26,/? = .008, r)p2 = .318] interactions were also significant.
At the long RCI, perseverative errors were far more common in the high- 
repetition block (77.4%) than in the high-switch block (52.2%) [x2 (1) = 12.48,/? = 
.0004], as in Experiment 1. However, as predicted, this pattern did not hold in the short 
RCI conditions [x2 (1) = .12, /? = .73]; the percentage of switch errors that were of the 
perseverative type was similar in the high-repetition (58.6%) and high-switch (56.3%) 
blocks.
Manipulation Check
When asked if they noticed any differences between the four different parts
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(blocks) of the experiment, 65% spontaneously reported a varying RCI and 40% reported 
noticing a difference in the proportion of repetition and switch trials.
Summary of Main Findings 
This experiment replicated the probability of a switch/repetition by trial type 
interaction when the RCI was long (as in Experiment 1), but showed that this interaction 
could be sharply attenuated by reducing the RCI. The difference between perseverative 
errors in the high-repetition and high-switch blocks was also replicated at the long RCI 
but eliminated at the short RCI.
Experiment 3
This experiment was essentially a replication of Experiment 1, except that 
participants were explicitly informed of the characteristics of each block (i.e., the 
probability of a repetition/switch) and instructed to make use of this information as best 
they could. This follow-up study was conducted for several reasons. First and foremost, 
overtly manipulating expectancies may clarify the above results to the extent that it 
produces larger effect sizes and more clear-cut patterns. Since the equal-proportioned 
switch block did not significantly differ from the other two in Experiment 1, it is unclear 
whether the observed probability effects were due to RT-costs (i.e., slowing on 
improbable repetitions/switches) or -benefits (e.g., facilitation on probable 
repetitions/switches) relative to a baseline -  repetitions and switches in the equal- 
proportioned block. That is, the distinction between preparing to repeat/switch tasks, not 
preparing to repeat/switch tasks, and preparing to not repeat/switch tasks was blurred. 
Experiment 1 also revealed unanticipated block order effects that may have only emerged 
because of the covert nature of the blockwise manipulation. The effect of explicit
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instructions on these block order effects may help elucidate their cause. Importantly, 
even with instructions at the beginning of each block, persistence- and flexibility-related 
processes would still need to be endogenously triggered on a trial-by-trial basis.
Method
Participants
Eighteen undergraduate students at the University of Windsor voluntarily 
participated in this study. They ranged in age from 18 to 49 years (median = 21). The 
majority (72%) were female.
Materials
Identical to Experiment 1.
Procedure
Participants were first given the same general instructions and practice blocks as 
in Experiment 1. When introducing the next phase of the study, participants were 
informed that there would be important differences between the three experimental 
blocks, and that these differences would be explained at the beginning of each block. For 
each one, participants were told the global probability of a repetition/switch trial in that 
block as well as how they may translate this information to local probability -  “after you 
perform a certain task on any trial in this block, it is likely that you will be asked to 
perform [that same task or a different task] on the very next trial.” Examples were 
provided. Finally, they were instructed to use this probability information to prepare for 
each upcoming trial during the brief pauses that precede them. Only after subjects were 
able to accurately paraphrase these instructions were they allowed to begin the block.
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Participants in this experiment completed high-repetition and high-switch blocks in a 
counterbalanced order, before (n = 9) or after (n = 9) an equal-proportioned block.
Results
Data Screening
Boxplots of global (across all blocks) mean RTs identified one participant as an 
outlier. This subject’s mean RT fell 2.3 standard deviations from the group mean, even 
though they reported a high level of motivation (10/10) to try their hardest on routine 
post-experiment questioning. Data for the remaining 17 participants were analyzed.
RT Data
Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 5. A 3 (block) X 2 (trial type) within- 
subjects ANOVA revealed no main effect for block [F(2, 15) = 1.20, p  = .328, qp2 =
.138], but a large main effect for trial type [switches > repetitions; F( 1, 16) = 54.60, p  < 
.00001, r(p2 = .773] and a percent by trial type interaction [F(2, 15) = 14.42, p = .00032, 
rip2 = .658]. See Figure 6. Planned comparisons revealed that probable repetitions were 
performed faster than unpredictable [t(16) = 3.31, p  = .004, Cohen’s d  = .661] and 
improbable repetitions [/(16) = 2.93, p  = .010, Cohen’s d  = .506], with latter two not 
differing [t(16) = 1.17, p  = .258, Cohen’s d = .244]. There was a trend for probable 
switches to be performed faster than unpredictable [r(16> = 1.88, p = .078, Cohen’s d  = 
.316] and improbable switches [t(16) = 2.28, p  = .037, Cohen’s d  = .481], with latter two 
not differing [t(16) = .28, p  = .780, Cohen’s d = .061]. Thus, it appears that not 
preparing to and preparing to not repeat/switch tasks are indistinguishable processes. 
(Note that effect sizes obtained for the probable versus improbable comparisons would be
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considered substantial by conventional interpretation, despite the marginal statistical 
significance associated with them.)
With block order added as a between-subjects factor (and the equal-proportioned 
block removed to facilitate interpretation, as in Experiment 1), a three-way block by trial 
type by block order split-plot ANOVA revealed no main effects for block [F (l, 15) = .08, 
p  = .784, rjp2 = .005] or block order [F(l, 15) = 1.77, p = .203, rip2 = .106], but a large 
main effect for trial type [switches > repetitions; F (l, 15) = 76.27, p  < .00001, r|p2 =
.836]. As expected, there was a significant block by trial type interaction [F (l, 15) = 
29.92, p  = .00007, qp2 = .666]. Block order interacted with block [F (l, 15) = 9.26, p = 
.008, r|p2 = .382] but not trial type [F(l, 15) = 1.06, p  = .320, r|p2 = .066]. The former 
indicates that participants produced relatively faster RTs for the high-repetition block 
when it came second and faster RTs on high-switch block when it came second. In other 
words, there was an overall improvement in RT from one block to the next. The three- 
way interaction was non-significant [F(l, 15) = 1.26,p  = .279, r|p2 = .078]. However, this 
is again misleading because the interactions at each level of the block order variable were 
driven by different (opposite) simple main effects. Post-hoc tests revealed isolated 
probability effects for switches among participants who completed the high-repetition 
block before the high-switch block [t(8) = 339, p  = .010, Cohen’s d  = .945] and isolated 
probability effects for repetitions among those who completed the blocks in the reverse 
order [t(7) = 4.14, p  = .004, Cohen’s d  = .925].
Since block order and practice are perfectly confounded, practice effects must be 
considered as an alternative explanation for the present replication of isolated RT 
differences for repetitions in one subgroup of participants and isolated RT differences for
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switches in the other subgroup. The practice effects hypothesis would predict decreasing 
repetition and switch RTs from one block to the next, regardless of the probability of a 
repetition/switch in those blocks (i.e., no interaction). If only probability affected RT, on 
the other hand, repetition trials should be performed faster in the high-repetition block 
compared to the high-switch block and the opposite pattern should be seen for switch 
trials, regardless of the administration order of these blocks. Note that these hypotheses 
run counter to each other in some cases but make the same prediction in other cases. 
Consider the group of participants who completed the high-repetition block before the 
high-switch block. The practice effects hypothesis predicts that repetitions and switches 
would be faster in the high-switch block relative to the high-repetition block. The 
probability effects hypothesis also predicts that switches are faster in the high-switch 
block, but that repetitions are slower in the high-switch block. The data show that switch 
RT is faster in the high-switch block, consistent with both hypotheses, and that repetition 
RT does not differ between the blocks. This latter null finding may reflect that practice 
and probability effects canceled each other out.
For this proposition to hold, there would have to be evidence of practice effects 
(unconfounded by probability effects) in the data set. A split-plot ANOVA comparing 
the equal-proportioned block that was completed first (before the high-switch and high- 
repetition blocks) and the equal-proportioned block that was completed last revealed a 
main effect of trial type [F(l, 17) = 14.78, p = .001, r|p2 = .465], a null interaction [F(l, 
17) = .002, p = .965, t)p < .001], and most importantly, a significant between-subjects 
effect for order [F(l, 17) = 12.14, p = .003, r\p2 = .417], consistent with practice effects 
for both repetitions and switches. Moreover, for participants who completed the equal-
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proportioned block first, there were within-block practice effects, as indicated by a 
contrast between mean RT for the first and second halves of this block [F(l, 8) = 11.22, p 
= .010, rip2 = .584]. Thus, there is strong evidence for within- and across-block practice 
effects over the entire course of the experiment, suggesting that an apparent absence of 
practice effects in certain blockwise contrasts really reflects existing practice effects 
countered by some other effect related to the inherent differences between blocks, i.e., 
probability effects.
The suggestion that practice and probability effects nullified each other also 
assumes that they were approximately equal in magnitude. It logically follows that when 
probability effects predict the same RT patterns as practice effects, the magnitude of RT 
difference will be approximately double that attributable to probability effects alone. Put 
differently, the isolated so-called “probability effects” reported above at each block order 
administration will overestimate the true effect of the probability manipulation by about 
100%. In other words, the RT difference at each block order should be about double that 
for the overall data, collapsed across block order (thereby removing practice effects). 
Indeed, the repetition RT difference for participants who completed the high-switch block 
first is 150 ms, approximately double that for all participants combined (66 ms; Figure 5). 
Also, the switch RT difference for participants who completed the high-repetition block 
first is 106 ms, about double that for all participants combined (56 ms; Figure 5).
The most important finding was that probability effects were evident for both 
repetition and switch trials in the overall data (collapsing across counterbalanced block 
order to remove the influence of practice/fatigue effects), consistent with Goschke’s 
model. Of interest, but of no theoretical relevance, when block order was examined as a
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between-subjects variable, practice effects were found to be substantial in our 
experimental paradigm, enhancing probability effects (twofold) in some contrasts and 
negating them in others.
Error Rates
As with the RT data, a 3 (block) X 2 (trial type) within-subjects ANOVA revealed 
no main effect for block [F(2, 16) = 3.01, p  = .078, r|p2 = .274], but a large main effect for 
trial type [F(l, 17) = 17.05,/? = .001, r|p2 = .501]. However, the interaction effect failed 
to reach significance, F(2, 16) = 1.97, /? = .172, r|p2 = .197. For the block by trial type by 
block order split-plot ANOVA, the only significant effect was trial type, F ( l, 15) = 
13.29,/? = .002, rip2 = .470.
The percentage of all switch errors that were perseverative was 45.9% in the high- 
switch block, 59.3% in the equal-proportioned block, and 72.9% in the high-repetition 
block. The perseverative error rate in high-switch block was significantly lower than in 
the equal-proportioned block [x2 (1) = 3.90, p  = .048], which was only marginally lower 
than the high-repetition block [x2 (1) = 2.83, p  = .093]. The difference between high- 
switch and high-repetition blocks was large [x2 (1) = 12.31,/? = .00045],
Summary of Main Findings
The methodological parameters in this experiment were identical to those in 
Experiment 1, except that participants were explicitly told about the probability of a 
switch/repetition before starting a block and instructed to use this information to prepare 
for each forthcoming trial. A highly similar pattern of findings emerged. Switch costs 
were more than twice as large (196 ms) in the high-repetition block compared to the
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high-switch block (74 ms), but this interaction was now driven by significant probability 
effects for both repetitions and switches. These simple main effects were of similar 
magnitude (Cohen’s d ~ .5). Another important finding was that unpredictable repetition 
trials closely resembled improbable repetition trials, which were both performed slower 
than probable repetition trials. The same pattern was seen for switch trials. An 
examination of block order again revealed that probability effects were found only for 
repetition trials in one subgroup of participants, and the opposite pattern was found in the 
other subgroup. Follow-up analyses indicated that this was due to the presence of 
practice effects that were similar in magnitude to probability effects. These two effects 
were additive in certain conditions and cancelled each other out in other conditions. Of 
utmost importance, when practice effects were statistically removed, probability effects 
remained for repetitions and switches, as predicted. Finally, perseverative errors 
increased with the probability of a repetition.
General Discussion
In the present series of experiments, participants’ expectancies concerning the 
forthcoming trial were manipulated in the random-cued version of the task-switching 
paradigm in order to evaluate four key assumptions of Goschke’s (2000; 2003) model of 
the dynamic regulation of executive control. The first of these, that task repetition can be 
facilitated by a preparatory state o f persistence, is highly consistent with the robust 
finding that probable repetition trials were performed faster than improbable repetition 
trials (all experiments). This effect was evident even when probability was covertly 
manipulated (Experiment 1). Preparation for a forthcoming repetition was also consistent
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with the finding that the proportion of switch errors that were of the perseverative type 
increased with the probability of a repetition (Experiments 1 and 3).
Before concluding full support for this assumption, bottom-up processes must be 
ruled out as accounting for the reduced repetition trial RT and increased rate of 
perseverative switch errors in the high-repetition block relative to the high-switch block. 
Cumulative stimulus-driven task set activation over consecutive task repetitions (i.e., 
repetition priming) may account for why the inappropriate set was highly activated such 
that subsequent repetition trials were performed very quickly, or in the case of subsequent 
switch trials, perseverative errors were committed. This alternative hypothesis predicts 
that perseverative errors would be even more frequent and probability effects on 
repetition RT would be even stronger in the short RCI condition relative to the long RCI 
condition, since the latter would allow the stimulus-driven activation to dissipate to a 
greater extent. This is the opposite of what was found (Experiment 2, long vs. short 
RCI). Moreover, RT did not tend to decrease with position in a run of repetition trials 
(Experiment 1), further damaging the credibility of this hypothesis. Thus, the present 
findings heavily implicate endogenous processes such as sustained activation of the 
current task set as characterizing the preparatory state of persistence. This is consistent 
with Dreisbach et al.’s (2002) study, in which probability of a forthcoming repetition was 
not confounded with the number of consecutive preceding repetition trials, and yet robust 
probability effects were observed.
The second assumption of Goschke’s model, that task-switching can be facilitated  
by a non-specific preparatory state o f flexibility, was more controversial with respect to 
the preexisting literature. In most prior studies, participants switched between two tasks,
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so that when a switch was expected, task-specific preparation could be carried out 
(Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Ruthruff et al., 2001; Sohn & Carlson, 2000; but see Dreisbach 
& Heider, in press); having just performed Task A, they would prepare for Task B. This 
is not relevant to the assumption under question. Having participants switch between 
more than two tasks is necessary to study non-specific/generic preparation for a switch -  
getting ready for an upcoming task switch when the particular to-be-switched-to task is 
unknown. Not surprisingly, there is solid evidence that task-specific preparation is 
superior to generic preparation (e.g., Sohn & Carlson, 2000). However, this still does not 
address the prediction made by Goschke’s model that generic preparation is superior to 
no preparation, such as under conditions where the forthcoming trial type is completely 
random, or unpredictable (regardless of the number of tasks). Dreisbach et al. (2002) 
appear to be the first to have tested this prediction, and found that generic preparation is 
equivalent to no preparation, i.e., not facilitory. However, in the Dreisbach et al. (2002) 
study, multiple tasks were associated with the same stimulus features. An upcoming 
switch trial could have involved performing a different task based on the same stimulus 
feature or a different task based on a different stimulus feature. Because of the former 
possibility, biased processing of particular stimulus features — one tenable account for 
how generic preparation could be beneficial, was not advantageous. The methodology in 
the present study allowed it to be advantageous, and produced the finding that general 
preparation was better than no preparation, at least when the probability of a 
switch/repetition was made explicit (Experiment 3). In other words, the current findings 
represent the first empirical support for a generic preparatory state of flexibility that 
facilitates task-switching.
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The finding that perseverative switch errors occurred at greater than chance 
frequency in the high-switch block (albeit with much less frequency than the high- 
repetition block) suggests that generic preparation for an upcoming switch trial, although 
helpful, was less than complete. That is, even when the task context promoted 
preparation for an upcoming switch trial during each RCI, and the RT data indicated that 
participants indeed did so, they were still unable to overcome the bottom-up activation of 
the no-longer-relevant mental set on some occasions. In other words, some degree of 
stimulus boundedness or “utilization behavior” appears to be normal. This is consistent 
with other studies of neurologically intact subjects (e.g., Robertson et al., 1997; Manly et 
al., 2002) that support the notion that perseverative behavior in brain-injured patients is a 
disorder of quantity rather than quality. This finding may also indicate that participants 
do not fully prepare on every trial, as De Jong (2000) suggests.
According to the third assumption that the processes that underlie persistence and 
flexibility are antagonistic, conditions that facilitate repetition trial performance (e.g., 
high repetition trial frequency) will inhibit switch trial performance and vice versa. 
Indeed, there was a highly significant interaction between trial type and probability of a 
repetition/switch that was supported by opposing simple main effects for both repetitions 
and switches, at least in Experiment 3. However, improbable repetitions/switches did not 
differ from unpredictable repetitions/switches (Experiments 1 & 3), indicating that 
preparing to perform one trial type does impair performance of the other trial type beyond 
baseline (i.e., an unprepared state). In other words, performance on repetition trials was 
not impeded by expectations that a forthcoming repetition trial is unlikely relative to no 
expectations. The same was true for switch trials.
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At first glance, this finding appears incompatible with the several studies reported 
above that demonstrate a “trade-off’ between persistence and flexibility. However, 
closer scrutiny revealed that these so-called trade-offs were between subjects or within- 
subjects between different conditions (repetition/persistence performance measured in 
one condition and switching/flexibility measured in another). These prior findings 
therefore do not necessarily conflict with the present finding of no trade-off within- 
subjects in the same condition.
The implication of this failure to support Goschke’s “antagonistic” assumption is 
that persistence- and flexibility-related processes are independent and thus suggests that 
they cannot be controlled by a single mechanism, or neural system. Dreisbach and 
Goschke (2004) proposed a global mechanism that modulates both persistence and 
flexibility, such as adjustments to “the threshold that must be exceeded by new 
information to gain access to working memory” (pg. 351). A high threshold would shield 
the current mental set from distracting information, supporting persistence, whereas a low 
threshold would promote background monitoring of potentially relevant information, 
supporting flexibility. The present findings are inconsistent with this or any other unitary 
mechanism model.
Single-mechanism models of persistence-flexibility regulation parsimoniously 
account for why many neurological patients exhibit both perseveration and distractibility. 
However, they are harder to reconcile with reports of double dissociations between 
various patient groups on measures of persistence and flexibility. For example, Stuss and 
colleagues (2000) demonstrated that patients with inferior medial frontal lobe lesions 
committed an inordinate number of set-loss errors but no more perseverative errors than
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non-frontal lesioned controls on the WCST. Patients with superior medial frontal lesions 
exhibited the opposite pattern. In another study, Yogev, Hadar, Gutman, and Sirota
(2003) found that relative to controls, schizophrenics with mostly negative symptoms 
tended to commit more perseverative errors whereas those with mostly positive 
symptoms evidenced over-switching in a modified WCST paradigm.
Another corollary of demonstrating that persistence- and flexibility-related 
processes operate independently is that the mechanisms that underlie them must not 
involve inhibition of task-irrelevant information. With respect to persistence, sustained 
activation of the current set is proposed as the mechanism for facilitation of probable 
repetition trial performance. Note that this differs from distracter resistance only 
(Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004) and sustained activation plus distracter resistance (Miller 
& Cohen, 2001) models of persistence behavior that presume inhibitory processes. As 
for flexibility, it has been previously demonstrated that backward inhibition of the no- 
longer-appropriate set only occurs with activation of a new set (Hubner et al., 2003; Mayr 
& Keele, 2000), i.e., not with generic preparation for a switch. In the present study, 
preparation for a probable switch trial could not have involved activation of a new (now­
relevant) set because the particular upcoming task (and therefore the relevant set, or 
stimulus-response mapping) was not known.6 It could also not involve simultaneous 
partial activation of multiple (potentially-relevant) sets because this would cause 
crosstalk (Ruthruff et al., 2001). Biased processing of (relatively) novel stimulus features 
(e.g., Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004) or complex conjunctives of potentially-relevant 
stimulus features (e.g., color and shape; Desimone & Duncan, 1995) is possible however,
6 Activation o f the new set is likely at play in task-specific switch preparation, though, and probably 
explains why this type o f preparation is superior to generic switch preparation.
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and may facilitate retrieval of a new mental set. In other words, flexibility may involve 
biased processing of stimulus features that facilitate retrieval of new mental sets rather 
than direct control of mental sets themselves. This may represent a viable explanation for 
why generic switch preparation is beneficial (and why it did not appear to be in the 
Dreisbach et al. (2002) study).
Consistent with this idea, a recent study using behavioral and neuroimaging 
probes provided evidence that top-down input involves amplification of task-relevant 
features and no accompanying inhibition of task-irrelevant information (Egner & Hirsh, 
2005). In a Stroop-like paradigm with famous names and faces, participants responded 
faster to incongruent trials when they were preceded by incongruent trials compared to 
when they were preceded by congruent trials. They found simultaneously greater fMRI 
activation of the fusiform face area of the visual cortex in the former trial type compared 
to the latter, when the faces were targets (and the names were distracters). Activation of 
this same region was remained at baseline when the faces were distracters, i.e., no 
cortical inhibition of task-irrelevant features was observed. They concluded that “target- 
feature enhancement constitutes the main selection mechanism when attention regulation 
is driven endogenously as to optimize performance” (pg. 1788), and proposed the neural 
mechanism for this as frontal signals that amplify the pre-stimulus baseline activity in the 
cortical region involved in processing a particular stimulus feature, spatial location, or 
object. However, as the authors point out, it remains to be demonstrated whether target- 
feature enhancement via cortical amplification applies similarly to preparatory (top- 
down) processes driven by expectancies regarding the upcoming stimulus (as in the 
present study) and that triggered by conflict (as in their study).
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With regard to the fourth assumption, the balance between persistence and 
flexibility processes is regulated in response to changing task context, it no longer makes 
sense to discuss a “balance” between them because they appear to independent rather 
than antagonistic. There is, however, solid evidence that processes supporting 
persistence and flexibility are dynamically regulated. In the present study, changing task 
context was operationalized as probability of switch/repetition between blocks. 
Participants’ expectancies regarding the upcoming trial type (repetition vs. switch) were 
influenced by subjective impressions of the relative frequency of switch/repetition trials 
(trial history in Experiments 1 and 2, and trial history + instructions in Experiment 3). 
Conditions that promoted expectations that a forthcoming trial was likely to require a task 
repetition led to facilitation of performance on repetition trials, while the opposite 
conditions facilitated performance on switch trials. In other words, the “persistence- 
flexibility dilemma” is best conceptualized as allocating top-down resources to support 
task continuation versus task shifting in order to optimize performance, given the task 
demands. The cost of misallocating top-down input seems to be essentially having no 
(useful) top-down input (i.e., a baseline unprepared state), rather than having to recover 
from a disadvantaged, or counterproductive state, as Goschke’s original model proposed.
In summary, the present data support several assumptions of Goschke’s model but 
suggest revision of others, and therefore advance our understanding of executive control. 
Specifically, they confirmed that task repetition can be facilitated by top-down set- 
maintenance processes, but also suggested that generic (non-task specific) preparation 
can facilitate task-switching, and that endogenous persistence- and flexibility-related 
preparatory processes are independently (rather than antagonistically) regulated in
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response to changes in the task context. This helps to explicate the nature of top-down 
contributions to attention and fits nicely with existing models of emergent executive 
control. Norman and Shallice’s (1986) supervisory attention theory states that top-down 
input is triggered when stimulus-driven behavior is inappropriate or insufficient. 
Botnivick et al.’s (2001) conflict monitoring hypothesis explains how this top-down input 
is triggered. The present revised-model takes this one step further by specifying that top- 
down input involves sustained activation of the current set if persistence is required or 
biased processing of novel or potentially task-relevant stimulus features to facilitate 
retrieval of new set if flexibility is required. These models can therefore be seen as 
complementary. The neurobiologically plausible cognitive mechanisms for promoting 
persistence and flexibility proposed here are not entirely novel, but rather a mere 
extension of Miller and Cohen’s (2001) model of relative activation of task-relevant 
processing pathways and Desimone & Duncan’s (1995) biased competition model of 
selective visual attention. It should now be clear that executive control emerges from the 
interaction of distributed cognitive systems, and therefore no homunculus is needed. It 
should also be highlighted that this is not a global theory of prefrontal cortex function but 
merely one important function that relies heavily on prefrontal regions and their posterior 
cortical and subcortical connections. The prefrontal cortex is involved in cognitive 
functions that go beyond controlled attention (Miller & Cummings, 2007).
Updated Literature Review
Following data collection for the present experiments, I became aware of two 
highly relevant research studies. Dreisbach and Haider (in press) also manipulated the 
percentage of repetition/switch trials in a block using two levels, 75/25 and 25/75. They
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informed subjects of this manipulation and encouraged them to make use of it to optimize 
their performance, either at the beginning of each block (global probability condition) or 
in between every trial (local probability condition). In their paradigm, subjects switched 
back and forth between two tasks -  deciding whether digits (1 to 9) were odd/even or 
smaller/larger than five. The cue indicating which task to perform was presented 
simultaneously with the target stimulus. The RCI was 1400 ms. The researchers found 
that overall RT was faster in the high-repetition block condition compared to the high- 
switch block condition and interpreted this as reflecting higher demands of the latter.
More importantly, probable repetitions were performed faster than improbable repetitions 
in both conditions. Somewhat in contrast, probable switches were performed faster than 
improbable repetitions only in the local probability condition7, and to a lesser degree than 
the repetition RT differences. This mirrors the disparity between repetition vs. switch 
probability effects in the current study. The authors did not offer an account for this 
disparity and nevertheless concluded that both probable repetition and switch trials can be 
prepared for, and that their findings are consistent with Goschke’s model of dynamic 
adjustment of cognitive control. Since their method involved two tasks, preparation for 
switches was task-specific, whereas it was generic in our study. Thus, their finding that 
probable switches were performed faster than improbable switches (at least in the local 
probability condition) does not address the assumption of Goschke’s model. The present 
study also added to the Dreisbach & Haider (in press) by showing that probability effects 
appear even when participants are given no probability information, but rather have to
7 Although not addressed by the authors, it is surprising that they found only inconsistent evidence o f  
beneficial preparation for probable switches when the identity o f the forthcoming task was known. This is 
at odds with several previous studies (e.g., Dreisbach et al., 2002; Ruthruff et al., 2001; Sohn & Carlson, 
2000).
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deduce it themselves. In fact, according to the manipulation check results, only about 30- 
40% of participants were conscious of the differing probability, consistent with the 
finding that people have poor subjective awareness of their preparatory processes in task- 
switching (Meiren, Hommel, Bibi, & Lev, 2002). Because the present study included a 
control condition (equal-proportioned block), it was also able to clarify that the 
probability effects were driven by RT-benefits of preparing for a repetition/switch rather 
than RT-costs of preparing not to perform a repetition/switch.
Another very recent and relevant study was conducted by Monsell and Mizon (in 
press, Experiment 4). They manipulated the probability of a task switch in the same 
manner as the present study, by varying the proportion of switch trials in a block (25, 50, 
and 75), but between-subjects. They employed bivalent stimuli that participants 
performed “shape” and “color” tasks on, with two different cues for each task. The 
authors held the RCI constant at 1650 ms and the CSI was either 140 ms or 790 ms. At a 
short CSI (like the present study), Monsell and Mizon found large switch costs (switch 
RT - repetition RT; -200 ms) when switches were unlikely, a smaller but statistically 
robust switch cost (-100 ms) when switches and repetitions were equally likely, and 
negligible switch costs when switches were likely (-20 ms). This is highly consistent 
with our finding that switch costs were large in the high-repetition block and virtually 
absent in the high-switch block. Unfortunately, repetition and switch trials were not 
entered as separate dependent variables in the Monsell and Mizon (in press) study, so 
their results do not clarify whether the reduction in switch costs with increasing 
probability of a switch trial was due to a loss of repetition benefit or gains in preparing 
for a switch, or both. Granted, this was not the aim of their study.
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Limitations
Despite the (albeit somewhat mixed) prior research suggesting that practice 
effects would be minimal, block order was a significant between-subjects factor in all 
three experiments. In the subgroup who completed the high-switch block first showed 
reliable RT differences for repetitions but not switches, whereas the subgroup who 
completed the blocks in the reverse order showed reliable RT differences only for 
switches. As discussed above, this pattern can be explained by a combination of practice 
effects and probability effects of a similar magnitude, such that they enhance RT 
differences when in agreement and nullify RT differences when in contrast. Clearly, the 
results cannot be attributable solely to practice effects, otherwise there would be only null 
effects in the overall data and no interaction effect at each block order. What we found 
were effects for both repetitions and switches in the overall data (with the influence of 
practice/fatigue effects removed; Experiment 3) and interaction effects at each block 
order, although these were driven by a main effect for one variable and not the other, 
suggesting at least some influence of practice. Interestingly, although not reported in 
their article, the Dreisbach & Haider (in press) observed a similar pattern of block order 
effects to the present study, though not in both subgroups of participants and not to the 
same degree (Dreisbach, personal communication, 2006).
The differences between Experiments 1 and 3 were mainly in magnitude rather 
than pattern. It seems likely that overtly instructing participants about the probability 
information made a greater number of them aware of these differences8 and strengthened
8 Differential awareness alone does not seem account for the between experiment differences. When a 
manipulation check variable (noticed vs. failed to notice varying repetition/switch trial frequency) was 
added as a between-subjects factor to the 3 (block) x 2 (trial type) repeated-measures ANOVA in 
Experiment 1, it did not modify the probability effect [F{2,  16) = .703, p  = .510, r|p2 = .081], the trial type
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their confidence in/commitment to preparing for the repetition/switch trial disproportions. 
The only appreciable interexperiment discrepancy was that the probability effect for 
switches was minimal and non-significant in Experiment 1 (in the context of a substantial 
probability effect for repetitions), whereas it was substantial in Experiment 3. The highly 
similar magnitude of the repetition and switch probability effect sizes in Experiment 3 
suggests that insufficient statistical power in Experiment 1 cannot explain the 
discrepancy. Of note, the results of a recent study (Dreisbach & Haider, in press, 
discussed above) replicated my finding that switch trial performance is less sensitive to 
manipulations. They demonstrated probability effects for switches when the probability 
information was provide on a trial-by-trial basis but not when it was merely provided at 
the beginning of the block, whereas probability effects for repetitions were seen in both 
cases. These discrepancies in both the present and Dreisbach & Haider’s (in press) study 
may reflect that preparing to switch tasks is entirely an endogenous process and is 
facilitated by greater environmental support. In contrast, preparing to repeat tasks is to 
some extent promoted by exogenous forces (priming) but can also be enhanced by 
endogenous input.
The three tasks used in this study were intended to be roughly equivalent in 
difficulty. Unexpectedly, classifying objects based on a shape was more difficult than 
quantity or color judgments. This may be an inherent flaw in the design of the WCST 
stimuli, where the three figures are arranged in a triangular form and the four figures are 
arranged in a square. This may cause added confusion because, for example, matching a 
target stimulus (card from the deck) containing triangles based on shape could be
effect [F ( l, 17) = 1.741, p  -  .204, r|p2 = .093], or the block by trial type interaction [F(2, 16) = 2.886, p  =  
.085, T)p2 = .265; unexpectedly, the interaction was marginally stronger in the group that failed the 
manipulation check],
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sensibly paired with the reference stimulus (key card) containing triangles, but also the 
reference stimulus that contains different shapes but resembles a triangle at the global 
perceptual level. The developmental sequence of perceptual dimensions may be an 
alternative explanation (cf., Odom & Guzman, 1972). Regardless, the three tasks were 
counterbalanced across blocks and trial types within blocks, and so should not have 
systematically altered the main analyses.
Future Research & Applications
To evaluate the robustness of the present findings, it would be helpful to test the 
effects of parameter manipulations (60:40/40:60 ratios in the high-switch and high- 
repetition blocks). The four main assumptions of Goschke’s model should also be re­
evaluated using a different experimental paradigm, to rule out methodologic specificity. 
To better understand why generic switch preparation is beneficial, future studies should 
design experiments that contrast the hypotheses that biased processing is of novel versus 
potentially task-relevant stimulus features. The present data cannot untangle these 
possibilities.
Functional neuroimaging studies would help elucidate the neuroanatomical 
underpinnings of persistence and flexibility related-processes. There is converging 
evidence that traditional versions of the task-switching paradigm activate a complex 
network that includes lateral prefrontal areas as well as non-frontal regions (Brass & von 
Cramen, 2002; Dove, Pollmann, Schubert, Wiggins, & von Cramon, 2000; Kimberg, 
Aguirre, & D ’Esposito, 2000). Interestingly, when the upcoming task is not explicitly 
cued (i.e., environmental support is reduced), as in the present study, greater medial 
frontal activation is seen (Forstmann, Brass, Koch, & von Cramon, 2005). This
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corresponds with neuroimaging research using conflict resolution paradigms (e.g., 
Stroop), in which medial frontal (including anterior cingulate cortex) activation is thought 
to represent signaling for greater endogenous control by dorsolateral prefrontal regions 
(MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger, & Carter, 2000). In the present study, the task context 
changed, demanding dynamic adjustment of executive control. This version of the task- 
switching paradigm can be predicted to rely on an interaction between medial and 
dorsolateral frontal systems to a greater degree.
According to Goschke’s theory, the cognitive hallmark of damage to the frontal 
systems is impaired context-sensitive dynamic regulation of persistence and flexibility 
such that patients may inappropriately maintain set when they should be switching and at 
other times (perhaps within the same test administration), be excessively distractible 
when sustained focus is required. In other words, it is the maladaptation to a changing 
environment rather than impaired set-maintenance or set-shifting per se. Based on this 
premise, the task-switching paradigm developed in the present study may be particularly 
sensitive to frontal-subcortical dysfunction. This claim could be evaluated by 
administering the task-switching paradigm developed for the present study to patients 
with various clinical disorders that involve the frontal systems such as traumatic brain 
injury, frontotemporal dementia, schizophrenia, and Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity 
Disorder.
Insofar as this holds true, the paradigm may be useful in the clinical assessment of 
neurological and psychiatric patients. The factor-purity of this paradigm, relative to 
traditional measures of executive control such as the WCST, might help to better 
characterize the nature of cognitive impairment following frontal systems damage and
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predict real-world functioning. Because of the substantial practice effects across blocks, 
adaptation would be needed. Either a long block with progressively increasing and 
decreasing probabilities of switch/repetition trial, or an ABABAB blocked design might 
be a solution. In the same vein of modern approaches to the assessment of executive 
functioning (e.g., the Delis-Kaplan Executive Function Systems battery; Delis, Kaplan, & 
Kramer, 2001), it would probably be helpful to include control task(s) in order to parse 
out the non-executive functioning components of task-repetition/switching performance 
(e.g., simple reaction time).
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Table 1. Trial type by response time data for equal-proportioned block in Experiment 1.
Trial type Response type RT Error Rate
Repetition Repetition 704 (128) 7.9 (4.6)
Switch 812(102) 5.1 (4.7)
Switch Repetition 952 (235) 9.9 (8.3)
Switch 875 (138) 6.9 (6.4)
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Table 2. Task type by trial type data for equal-proportioned block in Experiment 1.
Task type Trial type RT Error Rate
Color Rep 760 (104) 3.4 (1.2)
Switch 806(124) 9.0 (2.6)
Shape Rep 942 (146) 9.4 (2.2)
Switch 1027 (171) 7.8 (2.8)
Number Rep 718(118) 4.4 (2.6)
Switch 861 (159) 9.3 (2.0)
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Table 3. Block by trial type data for Experiment 1.
Block Trial type RT Error Rate
High-switch Rep 806 (155) 4.3 (4.9)
Switch 880(185) 8.0 (5.2)
Equal-proportioned Rep 785(104) 5.8 (4.1)
Switch 889 (158) 7.7 (6.2)
High-repetition Rep 736 (99) 4.8 (2.6)
Switch 918(137) 7.1 (6.0)
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Table 4. Block by trial type data for Experiment 2.
RCI Repetition: switch 
proportion
Trial type RT Error Rate
1000 ms High-switch Rep 818(112) 4.6 (4.1)
Switch 910(116) 9.5 (7.4)
High-repetition Rep 741(93) 6.4 (3.9)
Switch 912(149) 6.3 (4.6)
100 ms High-switch Rep 913 (156) 8.5 (7.6)
Switch 1049(200) 10.1 (7.5)
High-repetition Rep 839(110) 7.1 (4.5)
Switch 1030(165) 10.2 (7.1)
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Table 5. Block by trial type data for Experiment 3.
Block Trial type RT Error Rate
High-switch Rep 845 (127) 5.0 (5.0)
Switch 919(150) 8.2 (4.1)
Equal-proportioned Rep 883(179) 5.7 (3.1)
Switch 972 (236) 7.1 (4.5)
High-repetition Rep 789(94) 6.4 (2.9)
Switch 985(160) 9.1 (7.6)
82
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Figure 1. Pictorial display of stimulus-response mappings with a sample stimulus. This 
stimulus would be correctly matched to the green square (the‘C’key) if the color task is 
cued, with the two blue plus signs (V) if the number task is cued, and with the four 
yellow triangles (N5) if the shape task is cued.
▲ ▲
A A
■ *  * •  • A A
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Figure 2. Illustration of event sequence for a sample trial.
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Figure 4b. Mean error rates for various task recency values.
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Figure 6. Overall response time data for Exp. 3
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Appendix A
Manipulation check questions: 
la. What was different about the four different parts (“blocks”) of this experiment? 
lb. In the block with the least switch trials, what percentage of the trials were switch 
trials?
lc. In the block with most switch trials, what percentage of the trials were switch trials? 
Id. Did the difference in the percentage of switch trials change your response strategy 
in each of the blocks? How so?
2. How motivated were you to try your hardest, on a scale from one to ten?
3a. How concerned were you with answering as fast as you could, on a scale from one 
to ten?
3b. How concerned were you with answering correctly, on a scale from one to ten?
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